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I. INTRODUCTION AND PERSPECTIVE
America's urban centers are experiencing a renaissance of
sorts that reflects the vitality of a renewed interest in the city.
Dynamic growth and revitalization of the central city have
emerged since the 1970s as key focal points for investment and de-
velopment, replacing years of investing primarily in suburbaniza-
tion.1 The emerging activity in America's urban downtowns has
been more than an isolated or segmented investment in office
buildings. With strong political support and the emergence of an
affluent group of new urbanites, some central cities are said to be
transforming into entirely new urban environments where people
not only work, but live, shop, and entertain.2
This renewed interest in revitalizing America's downtowns,
* Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law - Indianapolis. B.S. in
Economics, Purdue University (The Krannert School of Management). J.D., University of
Florida. LL.M., University of Illinois. I wish to thank Paul N. Cox, Michael H. Hoeflich, and
Margaret A.P. Malloy for their willingness to listen to, discuss, and comment on my early
approaches to this Article. I also wish to thank my research assistant Shandon Vickers
Whistler for her efforts.
1. See Mickens, The City Fights Back - Downtowns On The Rebound, URB. LAND,
May 1986, at 11.
2. The Urban Land Institute (ULI) has called this reemergence of the central city a
"renaissance." Id.
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and in urbanization in general, is important for a number of rea-
sons. Among these reasons is a vibrant city's ability to give strong
identification and pride to local residents and politicians while also
providing the financial support necessary for varied educational,
cultural, and political activities that otherwise would not be availa-
ble in smaller communities.3 The most significant reason for pro-
moting the revitalization of America's urban centers, however, in-
volves the recognition that cities are a necessary, if not sufficient,
basis for fueling long-term economic growth, job creation, and cap-
ital formation.4 The economic strength of urban centers and the
extended regions that surround them is essential, not only for im-
proving the local standard of living, but for improving regional and
national economic prospects as well. Cities provide the closely knit
environment necessary for the incubation of many small business
enterprises. Only in the womb of the urban environment can the
small business enterprise or entrepreneur have access to extensive
sources of resource capital, flexible use of technology, close rela-
tionships with other similarly innovative firms, and close in-
terchange of workers and ideas with others possessing different
kinds of expertise.5
Cities and the health of their economies depend on a dynamic
market interaction that allows the nature of the business activity
within the city region to change over time. For instance, a city
3. See Lawrence, Constitutional Limitations on Governmental Participation in
Downtown Development Projects, 35 VAND. L. REv. 277, 294-300 (1982). In exploring the
constitutional framework of co-financing arrangements, the author discusses a number of
benefits that derive from urban development. In particular, he points to expanded cultural
and job opportunities from larger, more densely populated urban areas. Id. at 295-96. De-
spite these benefits, the author also recognizes that some co-financed downtown redevelop-
ment projects add little, if anything, to the city's export base and arguably may not create
new jobs because they merely locate in the downtown area projects that might be developed
elsewhere. Id. at 295. When this relocation process is the result of co-financing, the local
government support for downtown projects results in subsidies for downtown businesses at
the expense of suburban competitors. Id. at 295.
4. See generally J. JAcoBs, CrEs AND WEALTH oF NATzoNS (1984). This book repre-
sents a marvelous addition to the understanding of urban life. Jacobs stresses the significant
role that dynamic city regions play in contributing to the national wealth. Without strong
urban economies, the national economy would suffer. Jacobs argues that cities are the neces-
sary lifeblood of a national economy. It is clear from the book, however, that merely having
centers of dense population does not mean a strong and vibrant city region exists. Instead,
Jacobs argues that a city region alone is not sufficient; the proper type of city economy also
must be present. This requires an urban economy that is dynamic, facilitates import-replac-
ing activities, and allows for the formation of private capital and the free flow of people,
ideas, and capital.
5. See id. at 39-44.
6. Id. at 42.
[Vol. 40:67
CO-FINANCING URBAN RENAISSANCE
once dependent on industrial manufacturing of steel may need to
replace that activity with a new source of enterprise based, for ex-
ample, on computer technology. Likewise, as textile or shoe manu-
facturing moves from cities in the northern United States to cities
in the southern United States or overseas, the northern cities must
replace their source of commercial activity or confront economic
and political decline. The northern city that has lost its textile
manufacturing now may find that it has a comparative advantage
in electrical technology because of the presence of a world class
university. Thus, the city that once relied on jobs and dollars gen-
erated by textiles to import electronic technology and other goods
now finds that it can replace its economic base by replacing its
former imports with the local manufacture and exporting of those
local goods.7
This cycle of import replacement is a dynamic process that is
the product of natural market forces and the inducement of envi-
ronments favorable to the free flow of capital, technology, labor,
and ideas.8 As a setting for this cycle, the urban environment must
be viewed as a microcosm of the larger national or international
marketplace. Programs or efforts to revitalize urban centers must
be of a nature that stimulates an entrepreneurial spirit conducive
to job formation and experimentation rather than being structured
investments in static attempts to preserve the status quo.' This
realization is vital to evaluating current programs designed to
stimulate continued urban revitalization and to providing con-
structive recommendations for future efforts.
For American cities, the current economic and political cli-
7. Id. at 40-71. See generally Gorlow, High-Tech Location Decisions and Corporate
Dynamics, URB. LAND, Dec. 1984, at 14-16; Porter, Research Parks: An Emerging Phenome-
non, URB. LAND, Sept. 1984, at 6-9. These brief articles highlight some of the location factors
for attracting high-tech companies. The presence of a distinguished university is one such
factor. This example illustrates the need of a dynamic city to take comparative advantage of
its local assets and to recognize that over time the economy, as a dynamic process, will
rearrange those relative comparative advantages. As a result, new economic activities will
need to emerge to replace former activities.
8. See J. JAcoBs, supra note 4, at 45-58 (giving an example of the import-replacing
function and the dynamics of the urban economic structure necessary to facilitate that
activity).
9. See id.; see also Hatch, Italy's Industrial Renaissance, Uam. LAND, Jan. 1985, at 20-
23. This article outlines the tremendous amount of economic growth in the northeastern and
central regions of Italy as a result of an urban redevelopment program that stresses incuba-
tion of small scale enterprises. The numerous small scale enterprises encourage entrepre-
neurs and flourish on dynamic interaction with other small businesses. The entrepreneurial
structure of the redevelopment process encourages flexibility and experimentation that
leads to an enhanced economy.
1987]
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mate for revitalization presents special challenges for financing de-
sired development projects.10 In the current era of Gramm-Rud-
man and New Federalism, cities are finding little help from the
former New Deal programs of a more activist and financially sound
federal bureaucracy.1 As a result, cities have had to be more re-
sourceful and have been forced to implement local incentive pro-
grams in order to accomplish their desired objectives. The most
significant current incentive programs involve "public/private part-
nerships" that encourage pooling the efforts and resources of gov-
ernment and private enterprise for the mutual attainment of par-
ticular developmental objectives. Because most of these programs
really involve sharing the cost of the desired project, they can fall
under the general rubric of "co-financing."
The elated embracing of co-financing programs is illustrated
by the literature applauding its alleged results in real estate pro-
ject after real estate project and in city after city. Co-financing
10. In this context the notion of "desired" development projects does not necessarily
mean "desirable" development projects.
11. The Gramm-Rudman legislation, while having difficulties as a result of court inter-
pretations, does provide an indication of the fiscal attitudes now gripping the nation's capi-
tal. See 13 Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 682, 719 (1986) (concerning Gramm-Rudman budget
reductions); id. at 729, 768 (discussing court challenge to Gramm-Rudman and setting out
HUD housing cuts under Gramm-Rudman); 14 Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 135 (1986) (con-
cerning the Supreme Court's rejection of procedures for automatic spending cuts under
Gramm-Rudman). New Federalism is part of the Reagan administration's vision of reviving
the concept of states' rights and emphasizing local, rather than federal, solutions to local
problems. See infra notes 144-52 and accompanying text. New Deal programs refer to the
traditional "welfare state" approach to solving local problems with big budget federal pro-
grams. Id.
12. See, e.g., G. STOUT & J. Vrrr, PUBLIC INCENTIVES AND FINANCING TECHNIQUES FOR
CODEVELOPMENT (1982); ULI, JOINT DEVELOPMENT MAKING THE REAL ESTATE - TRANSIT CON-
NECTIONS (1979) (examining ways to assist development by improving public financing of
transportation facilities); R. WITHERSPOON, CODEVELOPMENT. CITY REBUILDING BY BUSINESS
AND GOVERNMENT (1982) (providing basic background on the codevelopment process); Bam-
berger & Parham, Leveraging Amenity Infrastructure: Indianapolis's Economic Develop-
ment Strategy, URB. LAND, Nov. 1984, at 12-18 (discussing various co-financing and incen-
tive programs Indianapolis used to encourage redevelopment); Brereton & Ashcroft, Road
Building, Texas Style, URB. LAND, June 1986, at 22-25 (discussing developing basic infra-
structure through public/private partnerships); Goodman & Nutting, A Tale of Four Cities:
Investment Activity in "Dying" Downtowns, URB. LAND, March 1985, at 32-33 (considering
Cleveland, Milwaukee, Detroit and Indianapolis); Gregerman, Federal, State, and Local Ec-
onomic Development Initiatives, URB. LAND, July 1984, at 21-25 (giving an overview of pub-
lic incentives for redevelopment); Levitt, Louisville, Kentucky: A Commitment to Develop-
ment, URB. LAND, June 1985, at 2-6 (describing the public and private sectors' meeting to
redevelop downtown Louisville); Mandelker, Public Entrepreneurship: A Legal Primer, 15
REAL EST. L.J. 3 (1986) (covering some basic concepts involved in co-financing without eval-
uating such activities' implications beyond the basic "how to" steps for guiding their contin-
ued use); Ratner, Charleston Town Center, URB. LAND, June 1985, at 16-17; Roark, Devel-
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has emerged from the "popular wisdom" as the answer to contin-
ued revitalization efforts in America's cities. Yet little, if anything,
has been written analyzing the political, economic, and philosophi-
cal foundation of co-financing programs. The purpose of this Arti-
cle, therefore, is to examine the political, economic, and philosoph-
ical issues arising from co-financing and to do so from the
perspective of classical liberalism. Understanding the classical lib-
eral perspective is vital to a full appreciation of the problems con-
fronting those who seek to stimulate the urban economy while pre-
serving the market environment necessary to give rise to economic
growth and prosperity. In order to aid this understanding, a brief
description of classical liberalism is merited.
Classical liberalism is a political and economic philosophy typ-
ified by a strong belief in individual liberty.13 In general, the phi-
losophy embraces a free market approach to law and social policy
as the best method of insuring the greatest possible sphere of per-
sonal liberty for the individual.14 Classical liberalism is not, how-
ever, a philosophy that requires the completely unfettered opera-
tion of a laissez faire economy. To the contrary, it is a philosophy
founded upon high standards of moral conduct and human dignity
that transcend purely utilitarian cost and benefit calculations and
simplistic notions that equate morality with wealth maximization
and market efficiency.' 5
opment In The Meadowlands, URB. LAND, March 1985, at 10-14 (describing public agency
as correcting past mistakes and leading developing with private projects); Schwanke, River-
place, Minneapolis, URB. LAND, Nov. 1985, at 2-7 (describing public and private co-financ-
ing arrangements allowing a new $111 million mixed use project to be constructed); Sedway
Cooke Associates, Joint Development, URB. LAND, July 1984, at 16-20 (explaining the bene-
fits of public co-financing arrangements); Walker & Zeller, Promoting Public/Private Initia-
tives for Preservation, URB. LAND, Nov. 1985, at 12-16; Wishneff & Eckel, Roanoke, Vir-
ginia: Revitalizing the Medium-Sized City, URB. LAND, Nov. 1985, at 22-27; Public/Private
Partnerships - The Key To The Rebirth of Downtown Retailing, UR. LAND, June 1984, at
26.
13. See Malloy, Equating Human Rights and Prosperity Rights - The Need for Moral
Judgment in an Economic Analysis of Law and Social Policy, 47 OHIo ST. L.J. 163-77
(1986). Classical liberals are a diverse collection of scholars typified by a strong belief in
individual liberty. Id. at 163. One of the founding fathers of classical liberalism was Adam
Smith, and his views have been expanded on by notable recent scholars such as Friedrich
Hayek and Ludwig Von Mises of the "Austrian School" of economics and Milton Friedman
of the "Chicago School" of economics. Id. at 163. For a basic introduction to the Austrian
School, see A. STRAND, THE CAPITALIST ALTERNATIVE AN INTRODUCTION To NEo-AusTRIAN
ECONOMIS (1984). My theory of classical liberalism derives from many sources, but primar-
ily represents a blending of "Libertarian Philosophy" and the philosophy of the "Austrian
School of Economics."
14. See Malloy, supra note 13, at 164.
15. Id. at 163-77. Even Adam Smith's great work, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND
1987]
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Generally speaking, classifying classical liberals as either "lib-
erals" or "conservatives," as those terms typically are understood
in the United States, would be inappropriate.16 The term "classical
liberal" derives from the British liberal tradition of Adam Smith
and David Hume and is espoused by such notable contemporaries
as Friedrich Hayek, Ludwig Von Mises, and Milton Friedman. 2 In
this context, a liberal is one who advocates freedom of the individ-
ual and reduction of governmental power and control. Over the
course of American history, however, the promoters of an active
role for government at the expense of individual autonomy
acquired the label "liberal." This role reversal has been the most
pronounced since the 1930s, when the term "liberalism" came to
be associated with a readiness to rely on state intervention and
paternalism, rather than on private voluntary arrangements, to
achieve certain social objectives.18
To the extent that classical liberals are not understood prop-
erly to be liberals, classical liberals are likewise not conservatives.
Conservatives, unlike classical liberals, do not quarrel with liberals
over the issue of how the power of government should be limited to
protect personal liberty, but rather concern themselves with who
should wield government power."9 Friedrich Hayek, for instance,
has described his disassociation with conservatism on the basis
that
it neither understands those spontaneous forces on which a policy of freedom
CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, (1776), cannot be read in isolation from his earlier
work, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (1759). Together, these works not only give us a
theory of human behavior in the marketplace; they also reveal Smith's underlying belief
that self-interest and happiness within society depend upon high standards of moral con-
duct. See Malloy, supra note 13, at 167 (citing A. SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTI-
MENTS 265-75 (E. West ed. 1976)). Classical liberals that follow the teaching of Smith con-
tinue to recognize the need for moral judgment in order to protect individual liberty.
Malloy, supra note 13, at 167. Individual liberty is linked to natural law concepts and the
idea of inalienable rights. Id. Economic arrangements can be limited in order to protect
individual liberty, and thus a totally unfettered laissez faire economy is not the sole objec-
tive of classical liberalism. Id.
16. See F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 397-411 (1960).
17. See, e.g., id.; F. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944); F. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION
AND LIBERTY; Vol. 1 - RULES AND ORDER (1973); Vol. II - THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE
(1976); Vol. III - THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE (1979) [hereinafter collectively F.
HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY]; L. VON MIsES, HUMAN ACTION (2d ed. 1963); L. VON
MISES, PLANNING FOR FREEDOM (1952); L. VON MISES, LIBERALISM IN THE CLASSICAL TRADI-
TION (3d ed. 1985); M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1982); M. FRIEDMAN, BRIGHT
PROMISES, DISMAL PERFORMANCE (W. Allen ed. 1983); M. FRIEDMAN & R. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO
CHOOSE (1980); M. FRIEDMAN & R FRIEDMAN, TYRANNY OF THE STATUS QUO (1984).
18. M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 5-6 (1982).
19. See F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 401-03 (1960).
[Vol. 40:67
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relies nor possesses a basis for formulating principles of policy. Order appears
to the conservatives as the result of the continuous attention of authority,
which for this purpose, must be allowed to do what is required by the partic-
ular circumstances and not be tied to rigid rule. A commitment to principles
presupposes an understanding of the general forces by which the efforts of
society are co-ordinated, but it is such a theory of society and especially of
the economic mechanism that conservatism conspicuously lacks.20
Thus, in an effort to recapture the original meaning of "liberalism"
as stressing individual freedom from unnecessary coercion by the
state, the terms "classical liberal" and "classical liberalism" are
used in this Article to refer to liberalism in the British tradition, as
distinguished from the current ideology of both conservatives and
liberals.
From the perspective of classical liberalism, this Article will
critically analyze current co-financing arrangements being used to
facilitate real estate development in America's central cities. This
perspective not only should provide an understanding of the vari-
ous co-financing techniques themselves, but also should shed some
light on how these programs affect traditional notions of individual
liberty and the relationship between state and private enterprise in
a primarily capitalistic society. In order to accomplish this objec-
tive, Part II of this Article will proceed with a discussion and
description of co-financing activities. Part III will consider the po-
litical and economic dynamics of co-financing arrangements and
the significance of President Reagan's New Federalism. Part IV
will assess the philosophical constraints on co-financing. Finally,
the Article will conclude with recommendations for restructuring
co-financing arrangements in a manner that would allow for con-
tinued urban activity while protecting the free flow of capital, tech-
nology, labor, and ideas that is necessary for the economic and po-
litical well-being of our cities and our nation.
II. THE NATURE OF Co-FINANCING
Urban revitalization is a complex problem even for cities lucky
enough to be experiencing a renaissance of broadly based eco-
nomic, political, and social renewal. Revitalizing many aging Amer-
ican cities requires a tremendous expenditure of public and private
resources. Revitalization does not mean merely arranging funding
for a new downtown office building. A lone office building, or just
20. Id. at 401. The postscript chapter to this book is titled "Why I Am Not a Con-
servative." Id. at 397-417. See also M. FRIDMAN, supra note 18, at 4-6. Both Hayek and
Friedman make affirmative efforts to distinguish themselves from conservatives.
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about any other specific real estate project, by itself is insufficient
to revive the lifeblood of a city facing industrial and commercial
decline, a deteriorating and neglected housing stock, shrinking or
vandalized recreational land use, and a crumbling infrastructure.21
Revitalization efforts must be broadly based and must integrate
the need for enhanced infrastructure with the need for restoration
or new development of commercial, industrial, and residential
facilities. This integration must be accomplished while preserving
recreational and artistic amenities sufficient to offset the dissipat-
ing influences of the less congested lifestyle available in the urban
fringes.
The size and scope of necessary revitalization efforts for many
cities pose monumental policy questions. First and foremost among
these policy questions is a choice of whether urban planning efforts
should strive for outcome specific results or merely for attaining a
general political, economic, and legal environment conducive to re-
vitalization. In other words, in the context of a dynamic, multi-
urban national economy, can local politicians and urban planners
be expected to select and promote the best revitalization plans on
a project-by-project, neighborhood-by-neighborhood basis, or are
revitalization efforts best realized by creating a foundation for
market-directed revitalization based on an enhanced free flow of
capital, technology, labor, and ideas? Before answering this ques-
tion, one must analyze the co-financing arrangements currently be-
ing used to facilitate urban renewal.
For purposes of general discussion, the current offerings in co-
financing programs can be grouped under two major headings:
acquisition, development, and construction assistance (ADC assis-
tance)22 and tax related assistance. These two broad categories are
in no way meant to be definitive, nor are they meant to assert mu-
tual exclusivity. Rather, these groupings are designed to facilitate a
quick and shortened discussion of the nature of co-financing pro-
grams before this Article addresses the more complex issues per-
taining to their use.
ADC assistance programs involve both direct and indirect
21. See generally, Lawrence, supra note 3, at 299.
22. "ADC assistance" is a term derived from the concept of ADC loans. These loans
are used for acquisition, development, and construction of a project. Acquisition involves
assembly of the necessary land. Development refers to land improvement requirements such
as sewer lines, grading, and paving. Construction refers to the process of constructing the
primary land improvement that defines the project as a hotel, shopping center, or other
project.
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methods of co-financing particular revitalization projects. The
major subcategories of ADC assistance require public and political
involvement in making direct loans or grants, sharing acquisition
or land improvement functions, undertaking provisions for collat-
eral-support structures and services, and using condemnation pow-
ers to effect parcel assembly.
Making direct loans to a real estate project involves the city in
a capacity similar to that of a more traditional commercial lender.
The city uses public funds to help finance a project to be devel-
oped by a private developer that the city selected.23 In return for
carrying part of the financing costs of the project, the city, like
other commercial lenders, will require a return on the loan. The
city may receive its return by taking a percentage of the income
the property generates, such as a percentage of rent in an office
building or retail center. In addition, the city may be given a right
to share in the property's future appreciation in the same manner
as a commercial lender would exercise an "equity kicker" option in
a commercial loan.24 In this way, the city shares in the project's
potential income flow and equity appreciation while also hoping
that the project itself will spur additional revenues for the city by
increasing job opportunities and property taxes.
In a time of governmental austerity, grants are becoming less
reliable as a source of revitalization funds. Nonetheless, they have
played, and continue to play, an important role in co-financing real
estate projects. Major grant programs generally rely on federal
funds being made available for local projects.25 Various cities apply
23. See Lawrence, supra note 3, at 304-10 (discussing various ways for a local govern-
ment to subsidize a transaction for a private developer). Making direct loans is merely a
variation on the theme of subsidizing a private developer. This Article will show that Indi-
anapolis has provided loan money, as well as other forms of co-financing, to private develop-
ers. See infra notes 97-116 and accompanying text.
24. "Equity kicker" refers to a lender's right to share in the equity appreciation or
income flow from the project. The equity kicker is provided in addition to payment of prin-
cipal plus interest. See, e.g., M. MADISON & J. DWYER, THE LAW OF REAL ESTATE FINANCING
1 2.01(3), 2.02(1), 3.04(3)(a), 8.09(3), 11.02(1), (1981) (discussing various approaches to the
use of equity kickers).
25. See Lawrence, supra note 3, at 288-93; [2 Ref. File] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) §§
20, 22, 30 (1986) (describing various federal housing programs and the programs' require-
ments); [3 Ref. File] Hous. & Dev. Rep. § 50 (1986) (describing various state housing finance
programs and requirements). See also Gregerman, Federal, State, and Local Economic De-
velopment Initiatives, URB. LAND, July 1984, at 21-25 (providing a brief overview of pro-
gram possibilities); Greene, Urban Development Action Grants: Federal Carrots for Private
Economic Revitalization of Depressed Urban Areas, 3 URB. L. & POL'Y, 235 (1980) (noting
that the UDAG program tries both to encourage economic development in urban areas and
to encourage resource coordination between public and private entities); Williamson, Corn-
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for limited grant or subsidy money on the basis of specific, project
oriented guidelines. These guidelines typically require evidence
that the proposed development will provide housing or jobs for a
certain number of low-income people or that the grant will be an
essential element in the renewal of a blighted neighborhood.26
Through the grant process, local city politicians aid private devel-
opers in constructing certain qualified projects by combining local
resources with funds from the federal government in order to share
the costs with the developer. Grant programs generally do not re-
quire a sharing of income or equity appreciation between the pub-
lic and private parties, but do carry restrictions limiting the profits
the private developer reaps .21 Thus, for instance, a private devel-
oper may receive a grant or other federal assistance to construct
low cost rental housing, but then may be restricted in the amount
of rent that it may charge.
Public sharing of acquisition or land improvement functions
can take several forms. The city voluntarily can purchase desirable
land for a project and then, as owner, structure long-term lease
provisions that reduce the private developer's overall project
costs.28 Alternatively, the city voluntarily might acquire the prop-
erty and then arrange a sale of the fee ownership to the private
developer either on an installment contract basis or by sale with a
purchase money mortgage with terms favorable to the developer. 29
Favorable terms that extend payments and allow for low nominal
interest rate equivalents amount to favorable subsidies to the de-
veloper. In yet another variation of this general scheme, the city
might acquire the land and undertake basic site improvement,
such as removing existing undesirable structures and upgrading
sewage and utility service facilities, before turning the property
over to the developer.30 This process allows the city to subsidize
the private developer with public resources by undertaking activi-
munity Development Block Grants, 14 URB. LAw 283 (1982); Nolon, Reexamining Federal
Housing Programs in a Time of Fiscal Austerity: The Trend Toward Block Grants and
Housing Allowances, 14 URB. LAW 249 (1982).
26. See Lawrence, supra note 3, at 288-93.
27. See, e.g., [3 Ref. File] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) § 50:0013 (1983) (describing a
number of restrictions on developers using mortgage revenue bonds, such as a cap on home
purchase prices, mortgage interest rate arbitrage, and the makeup of home buyers); [2 Ref.
File] Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) § 30 (1981) (providing guidelines and restrictions on multi-
family housing projects).
28. See Lawrence, supra note 3, at 304-10.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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ties that otherwise would be required of the developer to complete
the project.
By undertaking to provide for collateral-support structures
and services, the city indirectly subsidizes the selected private de-
veloper's construction of an approved project. The best and sim-
plest example of this activity would be when the city agrees to con-
struct a multilevel parking garage adjacent to the site for the
private developer's hotel, office building, or retail center.31 In this
way, the developer acquires the construction of a necessary amen-
ity, but at no personal expense. Likewise, the city provides a signif-
icant subsidy to the private developer in exchange for the devel-
oper's commitment to the approved project.
Finally, the city's condemnation powers can be used to assem-
ble a parcel sufficient for project development.32 Through condem-
nation the city can assist the developer in several ways.3 3 First,
condemnation provides a mechanism for acquiring property at
public expense by compensating the involuntary grantor. Once the
city acquires the property, it then can make the property available
to the developer through any acquisition-sharing method or land
improvement function. Second, condemnation proceedings allow
the city to eliminate any "hold out" problems when parcel assem-
bly involves the acquisition of valuable property rights from more
than one owner.3 The hold out problem and parcel assembly are
particularly troublesome for the large-scale project in a downtown
center. The urban setting often means that numerous fee owner-
ship interests, leasehold estates, easement rights, air rights, and
other rights will be involved. The large-scale urban developer,
therefore, is greatly assisted by a reduction in the cost of coordi-
nating numerous voluntary exchanges for these valuable develop-
ment rights and also is able to avoid the "blackmail" prices and
"won't sell at any price" problems of hold out owners.3 5
Tax related assistance also is a major part of co-financing ef-
forts to revive urban centers. The major subcategories of tax re-
lated assistance include the following: tax abatement, enterprise
31. Id. at 311-18.
32. Id. at 279-300. See also Mandelker, supra note 12, at 4-10 (discussing the use and
advantages of the power of eminent domain in assisting urban redevelopment).
33. See supra note 32.
34. The hold out problem will be discussed more fully infra at text accompanying
notes 70-78.
35. Blackmail prices will be discussed more fully infra at text accompanying notes 70-
1987]
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zones, tax increment financing, and bonds.
Tax abatement schemes focus on attempts to lure specific
businesses or construction projects to a city by means of a sched-
uled reduction in real property taxes and other local service fees
and tax assessments. 6 In exchange for the city's concessions on
taxes, the incoming business or project developer agrees to operate
its facility for a given period of time and attempts to predict a
favorable impact on local job creation and a long-term enhance-
ment of the local tax base.37 The trade-off, in other words, involves
a short-term city subsidy to the private enterprise in exchange for
a less than certain long-term benefit of greater local job opportuni-
ties and eventual additions to the city coffers as the abatement
period is phased out.
Enterprise zones, in a sense, are nothing more than better
structured approaches to tax abatement. The enterprise zone con-
cept has been used and promoted with varying evidence of success
in Great Britain and the United States.3 8 Enterprise zones take on
36. See Papke, The Effects of Tax Policy on Economic Development, KRANNERT
PORTFOLIO 4-5 (1986) (noting that while tax abatement and incentives can encourage busi-
ness location decisions, it is difficult to know how large a concession is needed or merited
relative to actual economic gains); Miley & Schneider, Is Tax Abatement Worth The Gam-
ble?, Indianapolis Star, Feb. 2, 1986 at 8, col. 1. In 1985 Indiana gave to private businesses a
tax abatement worth $24 million, which covered $255 million of assessed property value. In
1984 Indianapolis approved 100 of 108 applications for real estate tax abatement. Some
businesses in Indianapolis have received millions of dollars in tax abatement benefits. One
office building, for instance, will receive an estimated $7 million in abatement benefits over
a ten year period. Id.
37. See supra note 36.
38. See Boeck, The Enterprise Zone Debate, 16 URB. LAW. 71 (1984). This article illus-
trates the vast political, ideological, and administrative debate that underlies much of the
discussion of enterprise zones. Do the zones, for instance, encourage a new form of state
planning, or do they stimulate a market alternative to state planning? The author describes
the experience of enterprise zones in Puerto Rico as a failure. Id. at 81-83. See also Callies
& Tamashiro, Enterprise Zones: The Redevelopment Sweepstakes Begins, 15 URB. LAW.
231 (1983). This article provides an overview of enterprise zone initiatives in both the
United States and Great Britain, and provides a chart of economic activity that has been
fostered in various enterprise zones in Great Britain. Id. at 276-77. The authors also de-
scribe the enterprise zone concept as involving "a locally nominated, federally designated
and economically deteriorated urban area into which commercial activity is to be attracted
(and jobs thereby created) by means of a partial roll-back of federal and local taxes and
elimination of local regulations." Id. at 231. See also Solomon & Solomon, Enterprise
Zones, Tax Incentives and the Revitalization of Inner Cities: A Study of Supply Side Pol-
icy-Making, 3 DE. C. L. REv. 797 (1981) (exploring the problems of industrial migration and
urban underemployment as a basis for assessing the implications of business incentives pro-
vided through enterprise zones); Unger, Enterprise Zones: Some Perspectives on Anglo-
American Developments, 5 URB. L. & POL'Y 129 (1982). This article compares British and
American efforts on enterprise zone legislation. The idea of enterprise zones is said to have
originated in Britain and to have been advocated first by Professor Peter Hall on June 15,
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an attraction superior to that of most simple tax abatement
schemes because enterprise zones combine nonlocal subsidies with
local incentives.39 Usually, to qualify as an enterprise zone, a desig-
nated city area must have certain specified levels of high unem-
ployment and urban blight.40 Once the guidelines for qualification
are met and enterprise zone status is ascertained, a qualified inves-
tor or employer that moves to or expands its operations within the
zone is eligible for favorable tax treatment." This favorable tax
treatment serves to subsidize investment in the enterprise zone
vis-a-vis other areas unable to offer similar reductions in tax obli-
gations. In essence, the operative goal of using enterprise zones is
to reduce a substantial element of business cost-tax liability-in
exchange for business investor's making investments in the loca-
tions and within the guidelines prescribed by the government.
Ultimately, a continuing question about enterprise zones is the ex-
tent to which they foster new investment and new job opportuni-
ties as opposed to merely shifting business from outside the zone
to within the zone. 2
Tax increment financing (TIF) is another new co-financing
method currently being used to facilitate urban redevelopment
projects. 43 This method of co-financing allows the city to raise rev-
1977. Id. at 134. Professor Hall received his inspiration for the concept from his observa-
tions of the economic success of such free market urban economies as Hong Kong and Sin-
gapore. Id. See also Freilich, Frye & Carpenter, The New Federalism-American Urban
Policy in the 1980's: Trends and Directions in Urban, State and Local Government Law,
15 URB. LAW. 159 (1983) [hereinafter Freilich, The New Federalism]. The authors take a
rather negative view of the Reagan administration's efforts to address urban problems. They
see enterprise zones as the one viable program being offered as a solution to urban economic
difficulties. Id. at 188. See also Note, Enterprise Zones: New Life for the Inner City, 4
HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 243 (1981) (providing good basic reference background on the urban
problems allegedly addressed by enterprise zones); see generally, Enterprise Zones 18 LAND
UsE DIG. 1 (1985) (calculating that at the time of the article, 26 states and more than 450
cities had adopted enterprise zones).
39. See supra note 38.
40. Solomon & Solomon, supra note 38, at 803-23; Boeck, supra note 38, at 85-130;
Note, supra note 38, at 266-91.
41. See supra note 40.
42. See Hall, Housing, Planning, Land and Local Finance: The British Experience, 6
URB. L. & POL'Y 75 (1983). In practice, enterprise zones tend to shift business from outside
the zone to inside the zone and therefore provide little lasting benefit to the overall urban
economy. Id. at 83. See also Helyar & Johnson, Tale of Two Cities-Chicago's Busy Center
Masks a Loss of Jobs In Its Outlying Areas, Wall St. J., Mar. 16, 1986, at 1, col. 1. This
article discusses Chicago city politicians' long attention to the urban downtown. As a result,
the suburbs have suffered while the downtown center is active from government-related
subsidies and incentives.
43. See Mandelker, supra note 12, at 3-21. Professor Mandelker sets out the basic
requirements and guidelines for the use of tax increment financing. Id. at 15-21. See, e.g.,
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enue through offerings in the bond market. The revenue from the
bonds then can be used to assist a private developer in completing
a desired project."" The source of revenue the city will use in retir-
ing the bonds is the anticipated incremental increase in ad valorem
taxes generated by the presence of the new project in the down-
town area. 5 In other words, the city, having designated the appro-
priate location for its project and having selected a developer,
floats a bond issue to finance the project. The issue is backed by an
expectation that the new project, in fact, will stimulate significant
economic activity so that tax revenues from the area will increase
to a level sufficient to carry the cost of the bond obligation.
A final tax related assistance program involves the use of
industrial development bonds (IDBs).46 IDBs are used to en-
Schneider, City Builds Its Development Plans on Tax "Financing", Indianapolis Star, June
1, 1986, at C3, col. 1 (viewing TIF as a key in Indianapolis' redevelopment efforts and essen-
tial as a response to the shrinking supply of federal money); Schneider, Moldthan Warns
About Tax Increment Bonds, Indianapolis Star, June 19, 1986, at C5, col. 3. In this article, a
taxpayer's watchdog group cautions about the use of TIF and its potential to backfire. The
latest debate in Indianapolis concerned a $23 million bond issue to be sold to assist in the
construction of a project that includes a 13 story office building and a 1,100 car underground
parking garage. See also, Taxpayers in Some Communities May Pay More in Tax Incre-
ments, 19 LAND USE DIG. 5 (1986). This article reports on a study of nineteen municipalities
in'Milwaukee County, Wisconsin. Nine of the nineteen municipalities used TIF; the study
found that residents of cities that did not have TIF subsidized taxpayers in cities that did.
Id. at 12.
44. See Mandelker, supra note 12, at 3-21.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 10-14 (discussing IDBs); Fening & Russo, The Impact of Industrial Rev-
enue Bonds on Job Generation and Economic Development, 8 CURRENT MUN. PROS. 143-45
(1981). Sales of tax-exempt bonds to finance private businesses were as high as $7 billion in
1979 and cost the federal government as much as $1 billion in lost tax revenue. Id. at 143.
The typical business assisted by IDBs and IRBs employed 28 new full-time people and 13
part-time people, and the majority of jobs were in the sales, clerical, service, and operations
categories. Id. at 144. See also Cook, The Continuing Evolution of Industrial Development
Bond Financing, FLA. B. J., Jan. 1985, at 61 (noting increase in the volume of IDBs nation-
wide to $44 billion); Ide & Ubell, Financing Florida's Future: Revenue Bond Law in Flor-
ida, 12 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 701 (1985) (discussing the use of revenue bonds and the public
purpose doctrine); Note, Industrial Development Bonds: A Proposal for Reform, 65 MINN.
L. REV. 961 (1981) (discussing IDBs and the public purpose doctrine); Case Comment, In-
dustrial Development Bonds: The Demise of the Public Purpose Doctrine, 35 U. FLA. L.
REV. 541 (1983). See also INDIANA CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION FORUM, REAL ESTATE DE-
VELOPMENT & HOUSING LAW 1-32 (1986). The new tax act will diminish the value of IDBs.
Under the new tax provision, if five percent or more of the bond proceeds are used in a
private trade or business they will not be tax exempt. A developer still might find a taxable
IDB useful, however, if the city has access to better financial markets. Furthermore, munici-
pal bonds used for a public purpose remain non-taxable. As such, a city might continue to
use bonds for the construction of support facilities such as a public parking garage adjacent
to a developer's office building. In this way, municipal bonds can continue to play a role in
the public/private partnership of co-financing.
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courage the development of both industrial and commercial
projects.47 Like TIF schemes, IDBs rely on the city to issue a mu-
nicipal bond. 8 The IDB receives tax-exempt status and, therefore,
allows the city to generate money for acquisition, development,
and construction activities at a lower cost of funds than if the pri-
vate developer had to secure these financial resources from private
lenders.4 9 Thus, the city can assist the developer by offering lower
cost terms of purchase, lease, or financing than would be available
without the tax related subsidy. The funds to repay the IDB are
not generated from incremental increases in the local tax base, as
with TIF, but rather come from the project itself in terms of a
share in the income the project generates.50
The best example illustrating an arrangement allowing the
city to share in the income generated by an IDB project is a down-
town commercial use, such as a shopping center or an office build-
ing. Instead of selling the property to the private developer, the
city can use its IDB-supported acquisition of the land to structure
a long-term ground lease with the developer. In this arrangement,
the city acts as ground lessor and the developer as ground lessee.
The IDB's tax subsidy allows the city to arrange the developer's
lease terms at a very favorable rate. The city then can pay off the
IDB through the rental income flow under the ground lease, which
may include provisions for additional rent percentages keyed to
the success of the project.
This brief overview of both ADC and tax related assistance
efforts illustrates the broad nature and flexibility of co-financing
alternatives. Although each specific type of co-financing arrange-
ment comes with its own peculiar set of legal guidelines and pit-
falls, two overriding areas of legal concern exist for purposes of this
Article. First, what is the scope of liability that should attach to
the city when it acts in a co-financing capacity with a private
developer to complete a "quasi-public/private" real estate venture?
Second, what is the scope of constitutional limits on city involve-
ment in co-financing arrangements?
At least from the standpoint of formulating the inquiry, the
first issue of liability is relatively straightforward. Should a city be
47. See Mandelker, supra note 12, at 10.
48. Id.
49. See Mandelker, supra note 12, at 12; Cook, supra note 46, at 61 (stating that a
private developer taking advantage of an IDB can obtain an interest rate of between 65%
and 75% of the market prime rate).
50. See Mandelker, supra note 12, at 10.
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liable for its activities when those activities include acting in a pro-
prietary and managerial capacity in the development of real estate
projects? 51 Many of the co-financing techniques described in this
Article reveal that the city can be involved heavily in planning,
structuring, and supervising a co-financed real estate venture. It
also is evident that the city often expects a monetary reward of one
sort or another keyed to a project's ultimate success. This financial
reward can be direct, as in lease payments under a ground lease
when the city is the ground lessor, or it can be indirect, as in ex-
pected increases in real property taxes. The anticipated increase in
real property taxes may be the return necessary to justify the city's
co-financing efforts to local residents, or it may provide the neces-
sary basis for meeting the debt service on a bond issue. In either
event, the city, in its own way, has a financial stake in the success
of its real estate projects similar to that of a private developer.
Given that the city voluntarily undertakes to compete in the
primarily private activity of real estate development and that it
acts in many respects like a private developer, the city ought to be
held legally accountable to the same extent that any private devel-
oper would be if it were performing the co-financing functions un-
dertaken by the city. 52 For individuals who contract with or are
injured on the premises of a project co-financed by the city, the
choice of available remedies or defendants should not change
merely because the owner of the underlying fee interest in the pro-
ject is the city rather than a private development corporation. In
other words, if a city is going to be a real estate developer by tak-
ing credit for successful projects and participating in project man-
agement and profit, then the city should be a developer in the ful-
51. See generally Malloy, The Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act: Its Require-
ments, Consequences, and Implications for Persons Participating in Real Estate Develop-
ment, 24 B.C.L. REV. 1187 (1983) [hereinafter as Malloy, ILSFDA]; Malloy, Lender Liability
for Negligent Real Estate Appraisals, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 53 [hereinafter Malloy, Lender
Liability]. Both of these articles consider the amount of managerial and proprietary inter-
ests that various parties, especially lenders, have in real estate development projects. To the
extent that a party exercises a proprietary or managerial role in a project, a commensurate
degree of liability should attach to that conduct. Just as liability should attach to lenders or
a developer's agents or business partners, so too should liability attach to a city when it
engages in similar activities. See also M. MADISON & J. DwYER, THE LAW OF REAL ESTATE
FINANCING 1 4.04(7) (1984) (describing potential lender liability in a joint venture setting);
Malloy, Creative Financing Exposes Lenders to Developers' Liabilities, REAL EST. REV.,
Sum. 1986, at 60 [hereinafter Malloy, Creative Financing] (providing a quick overview of
the potential for lender liability).
52. See supra note 51.
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lest sense of the word.53 This may mean expanding the liability of
cities engaged in revitalization efforts. As long as the expansion of
liability merely reflects the cost of engaging in such activities, how-
ever, it should pose no major problem to city planners. After all, it
would seem that good city planning requires access to good and
complete information on the cost of city activities, and potential
liability factors should be included in evaluating the costs and ben-
efits of a given project.
If a city is not to be held liable as a co-developer, however,
then, at least in its co-financing activities, the city ought to be sub-
ject to the same legal scrutiny applicable to a real estate lender.54
A real estate lender can be held liable for its project lending activ-
ity.5 5 The best example of such activity involves construction loan
financing or permanent loan financing when the lender takes an
equity kicker option as part of its loan arrangement. The equity
kicker requires the developer to share project profits with the
lender as an additional incentive for the loan. In this way, the
lender not only gets fees and interest payments on the loan, but
also shares in the rewards of a successful project. The lender in
most major construction loan situations also takes an active role,
much like the supervisory role of a city engaged in co-financing
activities, in approving and monitoring project plans, specifica-
tions, and completion requirements. It seems only fair that a
lender actively seeking to improve its potential economic return on
a project by sharing in the developer's success also should be
legally accountable for the same risks and liabilities that justify its
earning additional developer profits."6 The same should hold true
for a city engaging in similar activities. In short, then, the eco-
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See generally Malloy, ILSFDA, supra note 51 at 1228-36 (discussing the implica-
tions of expanding developer-type liability to lenders and others); Malloy, Lender Liability,
supra note 51, at 67-89. This part of the article focuses on theories of liability for lend-
ers-especially when creative financing is used. Co-financing involves a city acting like a
lender in providing creative financing and thus is the basis for asserting similar treatment
with respect to liability. In each situation, the effort is to treat the private lender or city co-
financier as a truly equal member of the development team, and this requires extending a
greater degree of liability to them than traditionally has been imposed. The grounds for not
imposing developer liability on lenders, for instance, traditionally have been that lenders are
mere passive sources of money. Because lenders exert supervisory control over much of to-
day's current real estate development and because they share in ownership or equity partici-
pation, however, they are no longer passive lenders of money-they are active developers.
Id. See also Malloy, Creative Financing, supra note 51.
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nomic freedom to engage in these types of real estate projects must
be accompanied by economic responsibility that attributes liability
and risk to participants as a counterbalance to potential profit
rewards.
The constitutional limits to city co-financing activities have
been analyzed extensively by Professor David M. Lawrence57 and
recently commented on by Professor Daniel R. Mandelker. 58
Because this Article involves the broader discussion of political
economy, the treatment of these unsettled and complex constitu-
tional issues will be brief. It is important, however, to summarize
the major areas of constitutional contention in order to facilitate
an understanding of the broader political, economic, and philo-
sophical issues arising from urban revitalization. Thus, discussion
of constitutional limitations will focus on issues involving a city's
liability for anticompetitive practices, the public purpose doctrine
relevant to public expenditures, and the "takings" questions.
In coordinating and facilitating urban revitalization, city gov-
ernments often make decisions that can be viewed as anticompeti-
tive. To the extent that a city's activities are anticompetitive, they
raise a constitutional question concerning local government liabil-
ity for violation of the antitrust laws.59 These anticompetitive prac-
tices emerge as part of the redevelopment process when the city
aids specific developers either in project completion or in prevent-
ing competition in the vicinity of the completed project. For in-
stance, the city might aid a chosen developer in the completion of
a project by helping to acquire property and financing for the un-
dertaking. In this way the developer joins with the city to gain a
competitive advantage in completing the proposed project. In a
sense, the result is more than a mere competitive advantage, for
once the developer is selected, the city simply may use its govern-
57. See Lawrence, supra note 3.
58. See Mandelker, supra note 12.
59. See Freilich, Donovan & Ralls, Antitrust Liability and Preemption of Authority,
15 URB. LAW. 705 (1983) [hereinafter Freilich, Antitrust Liability]; Bosselman, Antitrust
Decisions and Questions, URB. LAND, Oct. 1985, at 34. According to the author:
Responding to concern by local governments about their potential liability in such
cases, Congress amended the antitrust laws in 1984 to relieve local governments and
their employees acting in an official capacity from damage claims. (Local Government
Antitrust Act of 1984, Section 3(a)). The act only prevents the award of damages, how-
ever, and does not preclude an injunction against the local government that violated
the antitrust laws.
Id. at 34. See also Callies, Land Use Controls: Of Enterprise Zones, Takings, Plans and
Growth Controls, 14 URB. LAW. 781, 789-92 (1982) (discussing antitrust problems for munici-
pal activities); Freilich, supra note 38, at 215-18.
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mental monopoly power over zoning and planning to prevent all
others from competing.
Preventing competition also is a component of city planning
and assistance that can continue to aid a private developer after a
project is completed. This result occurs when the city has planned
a revitalization district and determined, for instance, that it should
contain one retail shopping facility or one major hotel complex.
Once the developer is chosen for the project, a competitor has no
room to enter the area unless the city revises the plans. The pro-
ject's economic success might justify additional entry into the mar-
ket area, but the city, having co-financed the original project and
having a financial stake in its continued profitability, nonetheless
may continue to deny competitors entry to the revitalization
area. 0 This denial may not be permanent, but easily could extend
for a substantial period of time during which the city fostered
other selected projects in the area before allowing competitive
forces to upset the progress and direction of the overall revitaliza-
tion plan.
The constitutional issue that arises from a city's co-financing
activity concerns state action immunity from antitrust laws. Under
this antitrust exemption, there is room for a city to engage in an-
ticompetitive activities essential to its governmental functions.
When the city engages in proprietary activities or actively super-
vises private development projects, however, grounds may exist for
finding a violation of the antitrust laws." In some situations, it
also may be possible to allege a conspiracy by the city and the se-
lected private developer if the redevelopment plan in question is
exposed as a sham to cover other motives such as political favorit-
ism. 2 This possibility raises a serious concern for city governments
and city officials who potentially could confront antitrust liability.
It appears, however, that most city plans that exercise a minor de-
gree of caution in assisting private developers will be upheld under
current law as not violating the antitrust laws because a city has a
recognized, legitimate interest in its economic welfare.63
A second constitutional issue for cities engaged in co-financing
activities concerns the use of public funds and the application of
the public purpose doctrine. Applying the public purpose doctrine
60. If the success of the project would justify competitors' entry, then any efforts to
prevent entry will provide the city and its selected co-developer with monopoly profits.
61. See Freilich, Antitrust Liability, supra note 59, at 718-24.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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to public spending is similar to applying the public use doctrine in
eminent domain proceedings.6 4 That is to say, when public funds
are used by the city, they must be used for a public purpose.6 5
When a city expends funds directly or indirectly uses its credit to
support a bond issue benefiting a private developer, the public
purpose doctrine is called into question. 6 In both its direct and
indirect forms, co-financing can involve the use of public funds to
assist a private developer in completing and profiting from a pro-
ject. As a result, challenges to the constitutionality of these prac-
tices have been raised.6 7 For the most part, however, courts have
found that revitalization and urban redevelopment do serve a pub-
lic purpose, even when a city has decided that its ultimate goals
best can be achieved by delegating much of the redevelopment ef-
fort to private parties.6 Thus, even though public purpose remains
an issue of constitutional debate, it has been fairly well decided in
favor of city participation in co-financing activities.
The third constitutional issue associated with co-financing
activities concerns the "takings" question, or the power of eminent
domain. The exercise of the power of eminent domain raises ques-
tions concerning public use and, in that sense, is similar to the
public purpose doctrine.6 9 Eminent domain actions, also known as
64. See Mandelker, supra note 12, at 10-11; Note, supra note 46, at 969-71; Case Com-
ment, supra note 46.
65. See supra note 64.
66. Id.
67. See Mandelker, supra note 12, at 10-12. "Practically all of the cases have held that
IDBs serve a proper public purpose when they are used for industrial development ....
The use of IDBs for downtown commercial development has received less attention from the
courts." Id. at 11. The author discusses some recent cases, including Urbana v. Paley, 68 Ill.
2d 62, 368 N.E.2d 915 (1977), and concludes that most downtown commercial development
will be permitted under the public use doctrine even when a particular project is not part of
an overall redevelopment scheme. Mandelker, supra note 12, at 11-12. See also ULI, Public/
Private Financing Arrangement for Hotel Survives Court Challenge, 18 LAND USE DIG. 1
(1985) (citing Lartnec v. Fort Wayne-Allen Co., 603 F. Supp. 1210 (N.D. Ind. 1985)). The
article reports that the federal district court upheld the use of development bond money
and subsidies to aid a selected developer even when competitors challenged the subsidies.
68. See Mandelker, supra note 12, at 11-12; see also Lawrence, supra note 3, at 302-
10.
69. See Lawrence, supra note 3, at 279-300 (discussing the use of eminent domain
powers in property transactions to encourage urban revitalization); Mandelker, supra note
12, at 4-10 (describing problems arising when the power of eminent domain is used to assist
private developers); D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW
310-43 (1975) (providing good background on the topic of eminent domain); see generally R
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMIMENT DOMAIN (1985). In this
book, Epstein applies a Chicago School approach-an economic analysis of law-to takings.
His analysis centers on the assertion that the basic way to approach public takings is to
analyze the situation in the context of a private action between two or more individuals.
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condemnation proceedings, can be used to effect an urban revitali-
zation program.70 Basically, the various co-financing techniques
discussed in this Article lend themselves to the application of con-
demnation powers to assemble sufficient and specifically located
land parcels for a planned real estate project.
A city can use its condemnation powers to acquire private
property for a planned real estate project and can do so in a way
unavailable to the private developer acting alone. Through the
power of condemnation, the city can avoid both the "hold out"
seller and the "blackmail" price setter problems. The stereotypical
hold out seller is the elderly person who refuses to sell her home
because she has lived there all her life and does not want to move.
The typical blackmail price setter is merely a speculator who wants
to sell his property as the last parcel necessary to complete the real
estate puzzle. By selling last, this blackmail seller seeks a purchase
price that not only covers the value of the property, but includes a
premium for its being the last necessary parcel to complete the
property assembly. The blackmail price, therefore, is an attempt to
take advantage of the buyer's prior costs in acquiring the other
parcels. The blackmail price thus would not reflect the value of the
parcel itself, but rather would reflect the parcel's value to the
planned project.
In an urban setting, with many small lots and multiple owners
of easements, there is likely to be a great risk of confronting either
the hold out or the blackmail seller when undertaking a major real
estate project. The private developer may not be able to convince
all hold out sellers to change their minds. As to blackmail sellers,
the developer either will have to pay higher prices as a cost of do-
The state, according to Epstein, should be treated like a private citizen with the exception
of a few very limited circumstances when there is true justification for the state to act with-
out having to provide compensation. Epstein provides an interesting analysis of government
and of the constitutional framework that supports our system of private property. In con-
demning most of the current "New Deal" and welfare programs as unlawful takings, he
asserts that government has exceeded its intended limits as outlined in the Constitution.
His analysis, however, while thought provoking and useful, provides no real guidelines for
the moral imperatives confronting the concepts of inalienable rights, individual human lib-
erty and dignity, and their interrelationships to private property rights. See also, Burch,
Bozung, Miller & Hill, Land Use Controls: Public Use and Private Beneficiaries, 16 URB.
LAw. 713 (1984); Callies, supra note 59, at 792-96 (discussing takings); Malone, The Future
of Transferable Development Rights In The Supreme Court, 73 Ky. L.J. 759 (1985) (dis-
cussing partial takings and the concept of transferable development rights).
70. See Lawrence, supra note 3, at 279-300; Mandelker, supra note 12, at 4-10; see
also D. HAGMAN, supra note 69, at 400-10 (describing eminent domain as applied to urban
renewal programs).
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ing business or expend resources to hide the assembly process and
to keep full information away from necessary sellers. All these con-
siderations add to the cost and risk of completing a major down-
town real estate project, but, to a certain extent, this cost can be
reduced or subsidized by transferring it to the city.
The city can use its condemnation powers to acquire the pri-
vate property of the potential hold out or blackmail seller. In addi-
tion, the city can acquire the property at a price that reflects the
fair market value of the parcel itself, rather than at an inflated
blackmail price. After acquiring the property from the private
owners, the city can transfer it to a selected developer for the pur-
pose of completing the desired project. This process of using the
government's condemnation power to effect a taking of private
property for transfer to another private party raises constitutional
issues.7 1 After detailed analysis, Professor Lawrence concludes that
such activity is permissible under certain conditions.72 For in-
stance, the government permissibly may use its eminent domain
power in an effort to bring urban renewal to a slum area or to as-
sist downtown development that itself is viewed as a public use.73
The government, however, may not use its condemnation power
merely to assist the increased development of underdeveloped ur-
ban property that is not a slum area in the absence of a finding
that the increased development in itself is a public use.74
The determination that increased downtown development is in
itself a public use potentially can be problematic, but Professor
Lawrence offers justifications that indicate that most revitalization
projects would pass this test of constitutionality.75 For instance,
one public use justification is that downtown development can add
to the city's tax base in a way that allows higher density use of the
existing infrastructure, such as roads and utilities, rather than re-
quiring the extension of services to outlying areas.76 Second, many
jobs created by downtown development projects will involve un-
skilled hotel, restaurant, or retail work, and many of the city's un-
skilled and unemployed live in or near the downtown area. 7 Thus,
by encouraging downtown development, the city is promoting job
71. See supra note 69.
72. See Lawrence, supra note 3, at 320.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 293-300.
76. Id. at 295.
77. Id.
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opportunities for those people living in the project area. Third,
downtown development enhances the city's self-image and can fos-
ter cultural activities and specialized business opportunities gener-
ally not found in a nonurban setting.7s Because these justifications
are rather broadly based and easily asserted, it would seem permis-
sible to use the government's condemnation power to assist private
developers in most revitalization efforts.
As this discussion reveals, most types of co-financing activities
involve several constitutional issues. These issues have evoked
writing and discussion by legal scholars.79 Once these issues are
viewed for their practical effect, however, it becomes evident that
they do not prohibit co-financing arrangements. s0 They establish
guidelines and criteria for "proper" justifications for certain co-
financing activities, but provide no real impediment to the activi-
ties' continued use. The current status of these constitutional
guidelines, therefore, will be challenged in the recommendations
section of this Article.
Having described the nature of co-financing activities and dis-
cussed some of the major legal issues associated with these activi-
ties, it is useful now to consider how one city has used a number of
these techniques to foster its own "renaissance." This Article uses
Indianapolis as an example. Although other cities, such as New
York, 81 Philadelphia, 2 Washington, 3 Charleston, West Virginia, s4
78. Id. at 296.
79. See, e.g., supra note 69.
80. See, e.g., Rosenthal v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 605 F. Supp. 612
(S.D.N.Y), afj'd, 771 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1204 (1986); Lartnec
Investment Co. v. Fort Wayne-Allen Co., 603 F. Supp. 1210 (N.D. Ind. 1985). Both of these
cases illustrate the extent to which local governments can exercise political power without
infringing on constitutional protections. Regarding both a takings situation and a question
of public purpose financing, these cases hold that the city is free to act as long as it states a
public reason for the action. In Rosenthal the court implies that even if the main focus of a
redevelopment project is political, including the awarding of business and profit to friends
of local politicians, the project still is permissible as long as the local politicians also have
set out or asserted a public goal. 605 F. Supp. at 618.
81. See, e.g., Rosenthal, 605 F. Supp. at 612. This case involved a challenge to New
York City's effort to revitalize Time Square. The co-financing project involves construction
of several new high-rise structures at Time Square. In return for public assistance for the
project, the private developer is constructing and operating the new buildings and will con-
tribute money to the renovation of broadway theaters. The purpose of the revitalization
efforts is to eliminate urban blight in the area. The court said that the legislative process
established this goal and set out the plans to achieve it. The co-financing activity therefore
is not impermissible even if politicians also have as a motive the desire to make money for
private developers. Id. at 618-19.
82. See Algatt & Lenney, One Reading Center, Philadelphia, Playing the High-Risk
Development Game, URB. LAND, Jan. 1985, at 8. Philadelphia used almost $20 million in
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Minneapolis, 5 and Louisville, s" also have used co-financing tech-
niques, Indianapolis was chosen because of the availability of in-
formation. Indianapolis also is a good illustrative city because the
activities in the city have been broadly based and have involved
major long-term development on a scale significant enough, consid-
ering the size of the city, to have a major impact on the urban
center. Although these redevelopment projects, in actual size and
number, might have only a minimal impact in New York City, they
have a decidedly significant impact in a city like Indianapolis.
Indianapolis is a city of approximately 1,200,000 people lo-
cated in central Indiana."' The city comprises eighty-four percent
of Marion County's population, and the city and county share a
primarily merged governmental structure."8 As in most midwestern
cities, manufacturing industries traditionally have played a major
role in the Indianapolis economy.89 In the 1970s and 1980s Indian-
apolis experienced a serious decline in its commercial and indus-
trial base.90 The experience in Indianapolis was similar to that of
many other cities in the Nation's "Rustbelt."' Between 1970 and
1980, Indianapolis lost about 45,000 residents, and from 1979 to
Urban Development Action Grant money to build transportation support services to aid in
an office building project. Id. at 9.
83. See Sedway Cooke Associates, Joint Development, URB. LAND, July 1984, at 16.
Washington, D.C. used public resources to provide transit facilities as support for private
development. The article includes similar examples for Los Angeles. Id. at 19.
84. See Rutner, Charleston Town Center-An Urban Development Centerpiece in
Charleston, West Virginia, URB. LAND, June 1985, at 16. In supporting a private mall,
Charleston used $14 million in Urban Development Action Grant money along with other
incentives. Id. at 17.
85. See Schwanke, Riverplace, Minneapolis: Mixed Use with a Good Splash of Hous-
ing, URB. LAND, Nov. 1985, at 2. Public support for the $111 million project included $18
million through TIF used for land acquisition, demolition, construction, and street improve-
ments; a $19 million bond; two mortgage revenue bond offerings totaling $55 million; and a
general revenue bond of $6.7 million. Id. at 4-5.
86. See Levitt, Louisville, Kentucky-A Commitment to Development, URB. LAND,
June 1985, at 2. Louisville is promoting many redevelopment projects, several examples of
which are cited in the article. One example is the Louisville Galleria project, which had a
total project cost of $142.5 million, of which city, state, and federal assistance accounted for
$22.5 million. Id. at 3.
87. See Forstall & Starsinic, The Largest U.S. Metropolitan Areas, URB. LAND, Sept.
1984, at 32-33 (relying on 1982 figures derived from the Population Division, U.S. Bureau of
the Census).
88. See Bamberger & Parham, Leveraging Amenity Infrastructure-Indianapolis's
Economic Development Strategy, Urn. LAND, Nov. 1984, at 12, 14.
89. Id. at 13-14.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 13.
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1982, Marion County lost 35,000 jobs in the private sector.2
Despite this decline, Indianapolis actively pursued continued
downtown investment and a redevelopment strategy based on con-
struction of amenity infrastructure and sports facilities.9 3 As a re-
sult, since 1974 approximately one billion dollars has been invested
in sports facilities and related downtown projects.9 The downtown
business district alone has some forty office, retail, hotel, and hous-
ing projects planned or completed in the last ten years.9 5 All this
revitalization activity shares one principal common denomina-
tor-the city's willingness to engage in and foster co-financing
arrangements.9 6 As a result, Indianapolis presents an opportunity
to examine co-financing in practice. In later parts of this Article, it
also will serve as an example of the political, economic, and philo-
sophical questions that co-financing activities raise.
Through co-financing arrangements, the city of Indianapolis
has become developer, equity partner, or landlord for a number of
major downtown projects.97 Its redevelopment ventures have put
millions of dollars in taxpayer money at risk in real estate
projects. 8 These projects, while intended to revitalize the city, are
not charitable ventures, but rather investments in potentially
profit-making activities.9 " The success and profit of these projects
were not assured, and, in fact, most either have been marginally
profitable or have provided no pay-out to the city in their first
92. Id. In addition, 4,000 more jobs were lost in 1983 by the closing of a Western
Electric facility. Id. at 17.
93. Id. at 12-18.
94. Id. at 13.
95. Id. at 16.
96. Id. at 12-18. See generally, Goodman & Nutting, A Tale of Four Cities: Invest-
ment Activity in "Dying Downtowns," URB. LAND, March 1985, at 32, 33. Support for real
estate development projects is illustrated by the way Indianapolis spends its allocations of
Community Development Block Grant Funds (CDBG). In 1985 Indianapolis spent about
50% of its CBDG funds on real estate development while the national average for other
cities was only 11%, the remaining money being used for direct assistance to low and mod-
erate income residents in accordance with the CBDG program's original objective. Johnston,
Housing Funds Go Elsewhere, Indianapolis News, Nov. 17, 1986, at 25, col. 1.
97. See Swiatek, Tax Dollars are Working Hard in City Real Estate Developments,
Indianapolis Star, Sept. 1, 1985, at 11-2, col. 2; Bamberger & Parham, supra note 88, at 12-
18.
98. See supra note 97.
99. The chart that follows summarizes some of the co-financing activity in
Indianapolis.
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years of operation' 00 Only after a period of initial operations is the
city expected to see any major returns on its investment. Any
anticipated returns, of course, are subject to the risks of the gen-
eral real estate market and to the marketing and management
risks for each individual project.
Indianapolis' co-financing activities reveal more than a willing-
ness to take risks with public funds; they reveal that these activi-
ties can be highly advantageous to select developers. A single
developer, for example, is an owner of three major revitalization
projects in Indianapolis.' This developer also is behind the city
plan for 200 million dollars worth of construction for a downtown
shopping mall that would comprise 1.9 million square feet of new
and existing office space and would cover a two and one-half block
City Role
fee owner
and lender of
$1.5 million
for renovation
city floated
$4.5 million
in bonds to
buy and
prepare land,
which it owns
and leases
lender of $3.2
million for
construction
lender of $1.2
million for
renovation
lender of $6
million for
construction
fee owner
and lender of
$4 million for
renovation
Terms of
Contract
6% interest
for 35 years
60 year
ground
lease
6% interest
for 35 years
6% interest
for 35 years
City Income
50% of profits from theater, plus
annual rent of $30,000 and 4% of net
income from the theater restaurant
$360,000 annual rent and 5-7% of gross
revenue over $10 million
50% of profits
50% of profits
interest free $200,000 annually and 25% of net cash
for 30 years flow
Project
Indiana
Theater
Merchants
Plaza (offices
and the
Hyatt
Regency
Hotel)
One North
Capital (office
building)
Two West
Washington
(offices and
shops)
Embassy
Suites (Hotel
and shops)
Union Station
(Hotel and
retail center)
annual rent of $200,000 to $290,000 and
50% of net cash flow
See Swiatek, supra note 97.
100. See, e.g., id.. For example, the One North Capitol project was unprofitable in its
first full year of operation, so the city received no income. Two West Washington has been
unprofitable for the past two years and is not expected to show a profit until at least 1988.
Id.
101. These projects are One North Capitol, Two West Washington, and Embassy
Suites. See supra note 99.
6% for 25
years plus
rent
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area.10 2
The city is joining forces with this developer to assist in the
downtown mall project. Its assistance includes an initial outlay of
4.5 million dollars to purchase property and to do preliminary con-
struction work to enhance the project site.10 3 The city also will
purchase the necessary property for the mall from current owners
or, in the alternative, use its power of eminent domain.104 Addi-
tionally, the city plans to seek federal grant money for the redevel-
opment project and to provide a package of state and local tax in-
centives.10 5 As a result, the developer will be able to construct a
major downtown mall and earn substantial profits. Its profits will
be enhanced by its ability to use substantial public resources to
leverage its investment. For example, with city co-financing the de-
veloper will be able to share in the profits of a 200 million dollar
mall. Even though the developer will share profits with the city, it
stands to reap substantially more profit and prestige from a 200
million dollar mall than from being the sole proprietor of a much
smaller mall. In addition, the city's co-financing position will en-
hance the ultimate chances of the project's success because the city
will have an incentive to promote the mall by providing free adver-
tising and good will for the developer. In addition to the projects
outlined, Indianapolis has used a wide variety of co-financing tech-
niques, including tax increment financing,106 tax abatement,10 7 and
102. See Wildey & Schneider, Will Downtown Shopping Mall Help Indianapolis?, In-
dianapolis Star, Oct. 21, 1985, at C1, col. 1; see also Schneider & Wildey, Circle Cen-
tre-Mall Plan Unveiling Slated for Tuesday, Indianapolis Star, Oct. 20, 1985, at F1, col. 1.
103. See Schneider & Wildey, Mall Project Seen as Magnet to New Business, Indian-
apolis Star, Oct. 22, 1985, at Cl, col. 1.
104. Id.
105. Id. at C8. Indianapolis hopes to get $15 million to $20 million in federal money
for the project. The city also will arrange a package of tax abatement and TIF to assist in
the development of the mall. Id. See also Schneider, Delays May Benefit Proposed Circle
Centre Mall, Indianapolis Star, July 20, 1986, at B5, col. 1. In addition to seeking federal
grant money, the city hopes to subsidize the project by making 8% to 8.5% mortgage fi-
nancing available. Id. See also Schneider, Federal Loan Sought to Buy Ten Buildings for
Downtown Mall, Indianapolis Star, Dec. 8, 1985, at Al, col. 4 (discussing city efforts to raise
$9.5 million to buy property needed to assemble the land for the mall).
106. See Schneider, City Builds Its Development Plans on Tax Financing, Indianapo-
lis Star, June 1, 1986, at C3, col. 1; Schneider, Moldthan Warns About Tax Increment
Bonds, Indianapolis Star, June 19, 1986, at C5, col. 3; Newland & Petrosky, Hudnut Pro-
poses New Plan for Downtown Construction, Indianapolis Star, Oct. 10, 1985, at C7, col. 1.
The city plans to borrow $23 million to finance projects related to hosting the 1987 Pan Am
Games. The bulk of the money will come from TIF. Id. See also INDIANA CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUCATION FORUM, REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING LAW IV-6 (1986). Indiana also
has adopted enterprise zones. Two significant features of the enterprise zone are the Indiana
tax credit of up to $1,500 for each resident of an enterprise zone for whom a job is created
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the full range of ADC assistance, 08 in its redevelopment efforts. As
a part of its co-financing technique, the city has succeeded in in-
corporating federal and state assistance programs into its own re-
development efforts. 09
Indianapolis' best example of the incorporation of nonlocal
monies into a co-financed project is Union Station, which opened
to the public at the end of April 1986.11° The Union Station project
involved the sixty-five million dollar renovation of the old down-
town train station that originally had been completed in 1888."' In
1986 the station reopened as a hotel and retail complex with more
than 100 restaurants and stores and a 276-room Holiday Inn."'
The project, which opened amidst much fanfare, including live tel-
evision promotions on NBC's Today Show, brought praise to local
city officials and to the primary private developer." 3 The project
required the city, as owner of Union Station, to lend four million
dollars to the private developer at below market interest rates." 4
In addition, the financial viability of the project turned on the
availability of federal assistance. The project consumed 16.5 mil-
and a credit, equal to five percent of the interest paid, against Indiana tax available to
lenders making loans within an enterprise zone.
107. See Miley & Schneider, Is Tax Abatement Worth The Gamble?, Indianapolis
Star, Feb. 2, 1986, at B8, col. 1. (identifying major projects that have benefited from sub-
stantial tax abatements ranging into many millions of dollars).
108. See Swiatek, supra note 97; Bamberger & Parham, supra note 88. Co-financing
arrangements have been used to develop and promote such projects as Market Square
Arena (basketball), the Hoosierdome (football), and a world class olympic natatorium. Pro-
gress also is underway in building a downtown park and zoo at White River State Park. Id.
See also Swiatek, "Plot" Will "Thicken" When Work Begins On Lower Canal Project, In-
dianapolis Star, Feb. 2, 1986, at II, col. 2 (noting $7 million in federal funds obtained to
begin work on a riverwalk similar to that in San Antonio, Texas).
109. Among the projects illustrated in the chart, supra note 99, for instance, all but
Merchant's Plaza involved the use of $12.5 million in Federal Urban Development Action
Grant money. See Swiatek, supra note 97, at 12.
110. See Stall, State of the Union, INDIANAPOLIS MONTHLY, April 1986, at 60-76. The
station's grand opening was April 26, 1986. Id. at 60.
111. Id. In its prime the train station had served 200 trains a day. Id.
112. Id.
113. See id. at 60-76; Schneider, Station Reopening To Be Major Gala, Indianapolis
Star, Feb. 16, 1986, at Al, col. 1; Union Station, Indianapolis Star, April 20, 1986, at K1-
K16 (special section). The Star devoted a sixteen page special section of the Sunday paper
to promoting the grand opening of Union Station on the following Saturday. The Today
Show broadcast on NBC was one day before the grand opening. The local praise for the
developer included a rags to riches story of a son of immigrant parents whose first en-
trepreneurial venture was a lawn-watering business. See Stall, supra note 110, at 74-75. The
local hero, of course, stands to make a considerable profit from a venture that is substan-
tially subsidized and promoted at the public's expense.
114. See chart, supra note 99.
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lion dollars in federal money, of which twelve million dollars was a
grant for mass transit, even though Union Station in its present
form has very little to do with mass transit.115 Additional federal
assistance was provided in the form of a twenty-five percent his-
toric preservation tax credit that allowed developers to recoup one
out of every four dollars they put into the project.116
As these examples reveal, a city can use a variety of co-financ-
ing activities to encourage desired real estate development. These
projects require risk taking, but cities rely on their potential suc-
cess to generate an increased tax base and provide revenue for re-
payment of loans and revenue bonds. Indianapolis is just one city
that has experimented with co-financing arrangements, but it pro-
vides a good example of the types of projects and arrangements
that actually are used. Now, having described the nature of co-
financing activities and having reviewed examples of their use in
Indianapolis, this Article will assess the political, economic, and
philosophical implications of these activities.
III. THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF Co-FINANCING
Understanding the societal implications of co-financing
arrangements requires more than describing and analyzing the na-
ture of co-financing techniques. All too often the political and eco-
nomic dynamics of the programs are ignored. This part of the Arti-
cle will focus on some of the political and economic implications
and underpinnings that support urban co-financing activities. The
discussion first will consider the use of political means as an alter-
native to economic means in allocating scarce development re-
sources. Second, "liberal New Deal" programs for redevelopment
will be analyzed relative to the current trends of "conservative
New Federalism." Finally, this part will assess whether or not the
political and economic dynamics of co-financing truly facilitate the
emergence of the prosperous urban environment necessary for
115. See Stall, supra note 110, at 74. Congressman Andy Jacobs was a vocal opponent
of the Union Station renovation, and he was upset with the use of Federal Mass Transit
Funds. He stated: "That money was meant for buses, not boutiques .... [A]t a time when
student loans are cut and we are running up these God-awful deficits, I don't see the logic."
Id. Of course, Jacobs eventually did see the logic and was responsible for assuring the con-
tinuation of a federal tax credit for the developers that was scheduled to be eliminated when
the project still had $5 million in work left and the remaining tax credit was worth only
$1.25 million. Id. at 74-75.
116. Id.
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fueling long-term economic growth, job creation, and capital
formation.
Allocation of resources in a society can occur either by eco-
nomic or by political means. 117 In either case, the primary objective
is to allocate a limited supply of resources between competing uses.
The economic means for accomplishing this allocation is based on
the operation of a marketplace of exchange. Although the market-
place of exchange can be a barter system, it typically is understood
as a market in which price and currency act as the medium of ex-
change in order to facilitate transactions between numerous stran-
gers offering a wide variety of goods and services in exchange for
an equally wide variety of return goods and services. Thus, in this
market people continually are interacting as both buyers and sell-
ers; each buyer is at some point a seller and each seller is at some
point a buyer. The price mechanism provides participants in the
market with a ready source of information on the cost of certain
actions relative to possible alternatives. Furthermore, in allocating
the use of resources in the system, the market allows the buyer or
buyers willing and able to pay the highest price to obtain the re-
sources. Thus, resources are put to their most valued use.118
The political means, on the other hand, typically is a method
of allocation employed when market allocation is thought to be un-
desirable. Exercise of the political means occurs through the power
117. See A. NOCK, OUR ENEMY, THE STATE (2d ed. 1983). This book first appeared in
1935. It represents a classic challenge to the role of the state. For Nock the state is a vehicle
for class exploitation rather than a means for organizing society within certain limits that
protect individual liberty. By contrast, Nock refers to the limited entity that protects indi-
vidual liberty as government. Nock argues:
[T]here are two methods, or means, and only two, whereby man's needs and desires can
be satisfied. One is the production and exchange of wealth; this is the economic means.
The other is the uncompensated appropriation of wealth produced by others; this is the
political means. The State, then, whether primitive, feudal or merchant, is the organi-
zation of the political means. Now since man tends always to satisfy his needs and
desires with the least possible exertion, he will employ the political means whenever he
can - exclusively, if possible; otherwise, in association with the economic means. He
will, at the present time, that is, have recourse to the state's modern apparatus of ex-
ploitation; the apparatus of tariffs, concessions, rent-monopoly, and the like.
Id. at 46-47.
118. It is a basic assumption of economics that market allocations, by definition, are
efficient and result in resources being put to their most valued use. Two excellent texts on
basic economics are A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE & PRODUCTION-COMPETITION, Co-
ORDINATION, & CONTROL (1983), and R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, ECONOMICS (4th ed. 1975). For a
text on economic analysis applied to law and the notion of the marketplace and efficiency,
see R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3rd ed. 1986). Chapters 1 and 2 of Posner's
work provide background on economic assumptions, and the remainder of the book applies
an amoral and simplistic economic method to a variety of legal issues.
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of government.119 Having been entrusted with a monopoly on coer-
cive power, government can direct resources to politically desired
uses and, consequently, away from market allocations of resource
use.120 The government can do this by virtue of its taxing power,
police power, and other powers that give it the ability to enforce
redistribution of resources in a way not possible in the competitive
marketplace. In this way, the political means can allocate resources
not according to the highest bidder in the marketplace, but rather
according to the most influential participants in the political
process.
The political process in a democracy is a process of coordinat-
ing the desires and objectives of special interest groups within the
society. 121 The incentives of the legislative process reward legisla-
tors who use the political means to favor highly motivated special
interest groups at the expense of fragmented, diverse, and possibly
unknown interests. 122 For example, legislated rent controls provide
119. See A. NOCK, supra note 117, at 46-48.
120. See F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 20-21 (1960). Hayek discusses the
evil of coercion and the conflict between coercion and individual liberty.
Coercion, however, cannot be altogether avoided because the only way to prevent it is
by the threat of coercion. Free society has met this problem by conferring the monop-
oly of coercion on the state and by attempting to limit this power of the state to in-
stances where it is required to prevent coercion by private persons.The coercion which
a government must still use for this end is reduced to a minimum and made as innocu-
ous as possible by restraining it through known general rules, so that in most instances
the individual need never be coerced unless he has placed himself in a position where
he knows he will be coerced.
Id. at 21. See also L. VON MISEs, HUMAN ACTION 280-81 (1966) (arguing that liberty is best
preserved within society by putting coercive power in the hands of government and then
restricting government by the rule of law); F. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72-87 (1944)
(discussing the nature of general rules and the protection of individual liberty); F. HAYEK,
LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY, RULES AND ORDER - Vol.1 (1973).
The thesis of this book is that a condition of liberty in which all are allowed to use
their knowledge for their purposes, restrained only by rules of just conduct of universal
application, is likely to produce for them the best conditions for achieving their aims;
and that such a system is likely to be achieved and maintained only if all authority,
including that of the majority of people, is limited in the exercise of coercive power by
general principles to which the community has committed itself.
Id. at 55.
121. See A. NOCK, supra note 117, at 36-48; F. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY,
supra note 17. In this three volume work Hayek not only argues that the democratic process
is a way of coordinating the desires and objectives of special interest groups, but he goes on
to argue that, as such, democracy inevitably leads to socialism, statism, and the loss of indi-
vidual liberty. See also M FRIEDMAN & R. FRIEDMAN, TYRANNY OF THE STATUS Quo (1984).
This book condemns the Reagan administration for continuing to use government as a polit-
ical means to aid special interests despite Reagan's rhetoric to the contrary.
122. See F. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 17; see also R. POSNER,
supra note 118, at 491-507.
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immediate and identifiable benefits to a known constituency. Cur-
rent tenants have an intense, unifying interest in obtaining
favorable rent controls, and once those controls are passed into
law, the tenants become obvious recipients of any alleged benefits
from controls. The full benefits of a rent control program go to
only a small percentage of the population, whereas the costs of
such a program are spread out at minimal levels to numerous peo-
ple.123 Not only are the costs spread out over a much larger group
of people than those who receive the benefits, but many of the
costs may be hidden to the casual observer. For instance, what leg-
islative impact can potential future tenants have when they are de-
prived of rental housing because landlords find rental housing to
be an undesirable investment under rent control? 124 The nameless
future tenants affected by market divestment and a resulting
shortage of housing are no match in the legislative process for the
well-defined and motivated special interest group.
The rental housing situation under rent controls is no differ-
ent from the effects of special interest legislation protecting a par-
ticular industry or labor union. For example, consider protective
tariff legislation designed to protect the steel industry by reducing
foreign imports.'2 5 This legislation is said to be needed to prevent
"unfair competition," which is another way of saying it is needed
to reduce competition and competitive pressure on American steel
companies. 126 In this situation, the steel workers and the steel com-
panies have a strong and somewhat unified interest in protecting
their industry, which translates into protecting their jobs and their
income. A protective tariff for the steel industry, however, means
that United States steel purchasers will have to pay more for the
steel they use, and all products using the higher priced steel will
have an accordingly higher price to the ultimate consumer. In ad-
dition, to the extent that less of the cheaper, foreign steel is im-
ported, the steel importing business will lose jobs.
123. See Hoeflich & Malloy, The Shattered Dream of American Housing Policy - The
Need for Reform, 26 B.C.L. REv. 655, 663-70, 681-83 (1985) (discussing rent regulations and
their implications); H. HAZLITr, ECONOMICS IN ONE LESSON 127-33 (1979) (discussing rent
controls). This same problem occurs in class action lawsuits when numerous individuals
with a small amount at stake are more difficult to organize than a single plaintiff with a
great deal at stake. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 118, at 534-40 (discussing class actions).
124. See Hoeffich & Malloy, supra note 123, at 655, 663-70, 681-83.
125. See generally M. FRIEDMAN, BRIGHT PROMISES, DISMAL PERFORMANCE 359-72 (W.
Allen ed. 1983) (discussing trade, protectionism, and embargoes); H. HAZLIrr, supra note
123, at 74-84 (discussing how tariffs work and their short-term and long-term effects).
126. See generally supra note 125.
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From the perspective of the legislative process, the problem is
that the special interest group has a strong motive for invoking
government intervention, while the diverse consumers, who may
pay only pennies more for small consumer products using steel,
will have little reason to be aroused. In the language of the now
famous Coase Theorem, the consumer will have transaction costs
that far exceed his own benefits from opposing the special interest
legislation. 127 In addition, the legislative process cannot even iden-
tify workers who would have gotten jobs in an expanding steel im-
porting business. In this manner, the legislative process provides a
mechanism for using government power to benefit special interests
at the expense of the general welfare.128
Applying this analysis to government participation in co-
financing arrangements leads to a similar conclusion. Under cur-
rent practices for facilitating urban revitalization through co-fi-
nancing activities, special interest groups are using the political
means to reallocate resources to their own uses. 129 This results in a
127. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960); see also A. Po-
LINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 11-14 (1983) (providing a simple example
of the Coase Theorem as applied to air pollution problems).
128. See A. NOCK, supra note 117, at 36-48; see generally F. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION
AND LIBERTY, supra note 17; H. HAZLITT. supra note 123.
129. See DOWNTOWN DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH COMMITTEE & INDIANA CHRISTIAN LEAD-
ERSHIP CONFERENCE, INDIANAPOLIS: DOWNTOWN DEVELOPMENT FOR WHOM? (1980) [hereinafter
INDIANAPOLIS: DOWNTOWN DEVELOPMENT FOR WHOM?]. This book challenges the wisdom of
current approaches to redevelopment in Indianapolis. The book argues that both the poor
and minorities have suffered disproportionately from the results-such as neighborhood re-
location and a lack of basic services-allowing the rich and powerful to benefit from public
assistance. The book discusses numerous newspaper articles, and the authors link political
contributions to obtaining favorable governmental support for desired real estate projects.
One chapter entitled "Six Downtown Projects and How They Profit the Rich" discusses the
relationship between the local rich and their exercise of the political means for their own
benefit. Id. at 9-21. See also Bailey & Johnson, Uncommon Favors-Political Clout Steers
Much Government Aid to Trendy Apartments, Wall St. J. August 25, 1986, at 1, col. 1. This
article details the use of political clout, especially as exercised by Representative Dan Ros-
tenkowski, in order to provide public funds and support for a massive new housing project
in downtown Chicago. The project, known as Presidential Towers, displaced a number of
local poor in order to make room for the biggest housing development every built all at once
in the United States. The project consists of 2,346 apartments. Prime renters are young
professionals with an average income of $41,700. The project features many upscale ameni-
ties such as bars, restaurants, a health club, a gourmet grocery, and round-the-clock guards.
In addition to $67 million in government funds, the project benefited from Rostenkowski's
efforts in Congress, which resulted in Chicago getting aid long before its appointed turn in a
special lottery and in the entire project being exempted from the federal requirement that
twenty percent of the units be set aside for low-income tenants. In contrast to the profits
being made by friends and associates of Congressman Rostenkowski, the article depicts Chi-
cago's lack of ability to meet the needs of its poor. Presidential Towers has become a "Yup-
pie" dream while Chicago is unable to maintain heat, water, and elevator service at many of
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distortion of market allocations because allocations are made on
the basis of pure political power rather than according to competi-
tive criteria.
In the urban revitalization market, special interests employ
the political means to aid current, established urban centers at the
expense of suburban areas, emerging cities, and urban areas with
less political clout. The political means, of course, involve co-
financing, and as previously described in this Article, co-financing
involves the use of public funds and resources in promoting spe-
cific, politically approved projects in designated locations. Cities
such as Indianapolis, for instance, are able to encourage real estate
development in their downtown centers by subsidizing the cost of
projects. These subsidies reduce the cost of investing in Indianapo-
lis relative to investing in an unsubsidized area or project. In this
respect, public resources, which essentially are private resources
captured by the government for its own use or allocation,°30 are
used to assist one special interest group-the city of Indianapolis
and its key constituents-at the expense of other, more diverse,
and less visible interests. Significant in this public subsidy arrange-
ment is that many of the funds and resources used to subsidize the
Indianapolis incentives are provided not by the people of Indian-
apolis, who are most likely to benefit from the real estate develop-
ment, but rather by diverse sources throughout the state of Indi-
ana and across the United States."3 '
First, consider the various ways in which the federal govern-
ment can subsidize local development for a selected city and pro-
ject. The federal government, for example, can provide a city or
project with grants through the Urban Development Action Grant
(UDAG) program or with other direct subsidies through revenue
sharing., 2 Funds necessary to support these grants and revenue
sharing programs come from the general tax revenues or from
printing additional money, which simply adds to the money supply
and the national debt. 33 The tax-based funding method allows
its low-income housing projects. Likewise, as the supply of upscale housing increases with
projects like Presidential Towers, the supply of low income shelter is shrinking.
130. See H. HAZLITT, supra note 123, at 36; INDIANAPOLIS: DOWNTOWN DEVELOPMENT
FOR WHOM?, supra note 129.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 21-50, 87-116 (discussing various types of co-
financing arrangements and setting out the Indianapolis example).
132. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26 (discussing government grant
programs).
133. See M. FRIEDMAN & R. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE 253-70 (1980). In addition to
raising taxes or printing money, the government also can enter the financial markets to
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revenues raised from the entire national populace to be redirected
to benefit the redevelopment efforts of any given locality, such as
downtown Indianapolis. Likewise, tax-based funding can be accom-
plished indirectly by providing federal tax incentives for specific
types of redevelopment, such as that occurring in enterprise zones,
or by providing a twenty-five percent tax credit for historic preser-
vation, as in the Indianapolis Union Station project. 13  By using
the indirect tax-based funding approach, the federal government
forgoes collecting tax dollars from certain special interest projects.
This creates a financial incentive for that type of project, but
means the federal government must raise required revenue from
other taxpayers in order to make up for the incentives it provides
the special interest group. The net result is that numerous taxpay-
ers with diverse interests contribute incremental amounts to sub-
sidy programs directed to identifiable and cohesive special interest
groups. In the case of urban revitalization, this means subsidies to
selected cities and projects.
Like these tax-based funding methods, general revenue shar-
ing schemes allow the federal government to shift the receipts from
one state or locality to another state or locality for the latter's ben-
efit.135 Additionally, the federal government can provide grant
money and subsidies out of deficit spending. Deficit spending, how-
ever, is merely another form of tax-based funding, in that all
Americans pay for its negative impact on the value of the dollar
and on the national economy, while the special interest recipient
reaps all the benefits.
State programs to assist particular urban centers serve much
the same function as federal programs. To the extent that revenues
generated on a statewide basis are used to benefit a particular city
or project, a cross-subsidy benefits the special interest group able
to employ the political means. Likewise, state tax incentives in the
form of enterprise zones and tax abatement legislation serve the
special interest groups at the expense of other, less organized
borrow from the public. In so doing, the government must offer interest payments to inves-
tors, which must be included as part of the national debt. This increased interest obligation
puts additional pressure on the government to attempt to offset the debt by increasing taxes
or printing money. Id.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 110-16. Indianapolis used the 25% tax credit
for historic preservation to make the Union Station renovation financially possible. Without
this tax credit it is doubtful the project would have been completed despite the other pub-
licly funded assistance made available to the developer.
135. See Hoeflich & Malloy, supra note 123, at 681-83.
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interests. 3 6
Federal and state subsidies can be used in yet another, even
more indirect way to redirect revenues from one group of people to
the benefit of another. Consider, for example, the city that seeks to
proclaim a willingness to fund its own participation in a co-
financed real estate project. Rather than relying on state or federal
subsidies, it will provide only a locally funded loan subsidy for the
new project. Even though this scheme may require people from
throughout the city to subsidize the chosen project, it can be
argued that on this smaller scale, local level at least those asked to
pay-city residents-also will be the most likely to benefit from
the project. To the extent that the city does not require local tax-
payers to offset fully the loan financing subsidy for the project,
however, the city may end up seeking non-project-related subsidies
from federal and state sources for budget shortfalls such as wel-
fare, health, and transportation programs. 13 7 In other words, the
city can gamble on the local subsidy program because it knows
that, ultimately, another level of government will step in with
additional revenues to take care of any major shortfalls that might
occur in its budget for essential services.
Given all the foregoing, one must ask who really gains from all
this complicated cross-subsidy and co-financing activity. Is there
really a cohesive notion of a city as a spbcial interest group? A city,
of course, represents a political vehicle for the expression of the
political interests of its key constituents. In the realm of urban re-
development, these key constituents are the politicians and busi-
ness people most likely to benefit from the redevelopment ef-
forts.138 For example, in the Indianapolis illustration outlined
136. See Huddleston, Taxpayers in Some Communities May Pay More in Tax Incre-
ments, 19 LAND USE DIG. 2 (1986) Professor Jack Huddleston of the University of Wisconsin
at Madison has examined the distribution of development costs among taxpayers in
nineteen municipalities-nine of which used TIF-in Milwaukee County, Wisconsin. He
found that residents of cities that did not use TIF for real estate projects effectively subsi-
dized taxpayers in cities that did use TIF. Id. See, e.g., Enterprise Zones, 18 LAND USE DIG.
1 (1985) (noting that 26 states and more than 450 cities have adopted their own enterprise
zone programs); Callies & Tamashiro, supra note 38, at 231, 268-71 (discussing state enter-
prise zone initiatives).
137. The same process occurs in the housing policy area. Local governments can con-
tinue to pursue rent controls and other negative investment policies because they are able to
tap federal resources to offset the consequences of bad local policy. See Hoeflich & Malloy,
supra note 123, at 663-89. An interesting and ironic consequence of a policy of subsidizing
downtown development is that the resulting increase in urban density may itself foster the
need for further subsidies for related services such as mass transit.
138. See generally, INDIANAPOLIS: DOWNTOWN DEVELOPMENT FOR WHOM?, supra note
129. Business people, developers, and real estate professionals benefit not only from direct
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earlier in this Article, it was revealed that a single developer group
is involved in at least four major co-financed projects. 183  Such
developers clearly benefit from the subsidies of co-financing activi-
ties. Likewise, real estate professionals-lawyers, brokers, and
bankers-benefit from the increase in local business activity. So do
local union workers, such as construction workers who find work at
the new projects, and local workers employed to clean and service
the new buildings. Local politicians also gain favor and enhance
their reputations by pointing to the new buildings, activities, and
projects generated for their local constituents. 140
These results seem wonderful until it again is realized that the
buildings, activities, and profits generated for a city like Indianap-
olis come at the expense of as much or more activity that could
have occurred elsewhere but for the intervention of the political
means. Thus, it should be seen as no great surprise or miracle that
Indianapolis has become a comparatively richer or nicer place to
live. This has been made possible, after all, by making other parts
of the state and country comparatively poorer.14 1
Clearly, several conclusions can be drawn from this analysis of
the economic and political implications of co-financing activities.
First, the involvement of all levels of government in co-financing
activities allows numerous direct and indirect wealth transfers to
public subsidies that support their continued activities, but also from increased land values
when they own land at or near the location of a major redevelopment project. Id.
139. See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
140. See Helyar & Johnson, Tale of Two Cities-Chicago's Busy Center Masks a Loss
of Jobs In Its Outlying Areas, Wall St. J., April 16, 1986, at 1, col1. Chicago politicians
have poured one billion dollars into downtown incentives for construction, and the resulting
activity has been favorable to the politicians despite the fact the suburban areas are suffer-
ing. Id. See also Review & Outlook-A Hunger for Money, Wall St. J., Jan 28, 1986, at 30,
col.1 (discussing how mayors use and rely on federal subsidies to satisfy the special interests
of local friends and developers while claiming to be concerned with the poor and needy); see
generally Welfare for Developers, Wall St. J., April 3, 1986, at 26, col.1. This editorial dis-
cusses the tremendous amount of "welfare" being given to developers and related real estate
professionals by way of local access to federal UDAG subsidies. The article asserts that
states and districts with influential congressman benefit greatly from the subsidies through
extensive use of the political means. The editorial goes on to say.
Of course, the UDAG boodle is defended on the ground that it helps the "poor." But
60% of UDAG funds have gone to commercial projects; developers promise new jobs
but only two-thirds of those promised actually materialize, HUD estimates, and when
you consider that UDAG money comes out of taxpayers' pockets, there is little reason
to believe there is any net job "creation." Moreover, construction workers seldom are
"poor."
Id.
141. Id. See H. HAZLrTr, supra note 123, at 36 (discussing the predictable results of
this process of wealth transfer).
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occur between citizens and taxpayers. Second, the indirectness of
the methods that can be employed to achieve this income redistri-
bution makes it difficult to obtain good information on the actual
costs and benefits of government involvement in co-financing
activities.142 Indeed, it is not only difficult to determine the true
costs and benefits of these programs, it is nearly impossible to de-
termine who bears these costs. It is relatively easy to point to the
new office building or shopping center constructed in downtown
Indianapolis. It is next to impossible, however, to determine which
taxpayers actually paid for the project and, more importantly,
which towns and people elsewhere in the state or country lost out
on a real estate project or jobs because of the advantage Indianap-
olis gained from public funds. Third, the political means favors an
allocation of resources to established cities. Therefore, it perpetu-
ates a tyranny of the status quo because the established cities re-
present current, identifiable political and business interests that
are better able to capture the energy of the legislative function and
harness government power in the pursuit of their own special in-
terest. As a result, established cities are able to use grants and
other co-financing subsidies to attract and retain businesses that
otherwise would relocate to new or economically more desirable
communities. Finally, use of the political means results in resource
allocations that do more than simply transfer wealth from "A" to
"B." Presumably, to the extent that the political means redirects
the investment and resource allocations of the marketplace, it re-
sults in a net social loss in that the resources no longer are used for
their most valued and, therefore, most efficient purposes. 43 Thus,
in addition to "A" losing wealth to "B," society suffers a net total
loss because fewer total benefits can be derived from resources
when those resources are used in an inefficient manner.
These conclusions, it seems, are essentially unaffected by the
current political rhetoric of the Reagan administration and its New
Federalism. 4 4 "New Federalism" is a political phrase meant to dis-
142. See generally R POSNER, supra note 188, at 602-09. Here Posner deals with state
taxes and the incentive each state has to impose the burden of its taxes, so far as possible,
on residents of other states. The discussion reveals that state taxing policy often leads to
poor information for consumers and that, to the extent that the state can spread the burden
of taxes to nonresidents, the state is able to tax people who have no vote in how the state
operates. Id.
143. See H. HAzLirr, supra note 123, at 40-48.
144. See generally Freilich, The New Federalism, supra note 38 (taking a complete
look at Reagan's New Federalism, including urban development issues, tax issues, school
issues, civil rights issues, and housing issues); Bollinger, The Historic and Proper Place of
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tinguish the Reagan vision from that of earlier "New Deal" liberal
administrations. The distinction in vision, as applied to the way
urban revitalization programs are conceived and administered,
however, is more one of form than of substance. 145 To understand
this distinction it is first necessary briefly to describe both ap-
proaches: New Deal and New Federalism.
The New Deal philosophy carries with it all the baggage of the
"welfare state" that has grown up since the rapid expansion of fed-
eral government programs under the Roosevelt administration."4 "
New Dealers generally are perceived as people who support an
active federal government and who envision a need for federal
answers or responses to both state and local problems. New Feder-
alism, on the other hand, envisions a reduction in the role of the
federal government and a countervailing increase in the role of
state and local governments in resolving their own problems.14 7
New Federalism is supposed to allow for diversity and experimen-
tation, while returning control of government planning and
expenditures to the people. 148 The notion of returning government
Central Governments in Urban Redevelopment: The U.S. View, 6 URB. L. & POL'Y 53
(1983). Bollinger was Assistant Secretary for Community Planning and Development,
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, when he wrote this article.
His article reflects a New Federalism philosophy by stressing a strong national economy and
the return of many state and local issues to state and local government. He sees the federal
urban role as one of "urban facilitator," rather than provider, helping cities to be entre-
preneurial and innovative in addressing their economic and community development needs.
Id. at 54. See also Wingo & Wolch, Urban Land Policy Under the New Conservatism, 5
URB. L. & POL'Y 315 (1982) (arguing that the New Federalism is a conservative movement
that favors commercial and industrial uses and rejects social welfare programs, all of which
will lead to the "ghettoization" of the poor, the elderly, and the handicapped).
145. See generally M. FRIEDMAN & R. FRIEDMAN, supra note 121. In this book the
Friedmans argue that much of the Reagan administration's rhetoric is unfulfilled. In actual-
ity, Reagan has become trapped by special interest groups just as surely as the welfare Dem-
ocrats from which Reagan tries to disassociate himself. Although the special interests may
have changed, the use of the political means and the tyranny of the status quo remain.
146. See M. FRIEDMAN & RP FRIEDMAN, supra note 133, at 91-127, 228-29 (discussing
the growth of the welfare state and the expansion of the federal government).
147. See Bollinger, supra note 144; Wingo & Wolch, supra note 144 (discussing the
emphasis on local involvement and participation).
148. The theory is that putting power in state and local government creates a check on
the federal government's power. At the same time, to the extent that government is respon-
sive to the electorate, it is likely to be most responsive at the local level. See M. FRIEDMAN,
supra note 17, at 7-21. But see A. NocK, supra note 117, at 29. According to Nock:
[The] idea rests upon certain assumptions that experience has shown to be unsound;
the first one being that the power of the ballot is what republican political theory
makes it out to be, and that therefore the electorate has an effective choice in the
matter. It is a matter of open and notorious fact that nothing like this is true. Our
nominally republican system is actually built on an imperial model, with our profes-
sional politicians standing in the place of the praetorian guards; they meet from time to
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to the people is meant rhetorically to conjure up notions of small
town meetings and participative government free of the excessive
manipulation of the special interest groups that frequent the halls
of the Nation's capital.149
Despite the different emphasis inherent in each governmental
vision, there actually is very little difference between the New Deal
programs and those of the New Federalism. Both approaches focus
on use of the political means to attain politically desired outcomes;
the only real difference between the two is the method by which
benefits are bestowed upon favored special interest groups. Moving
political decisionmaking from the Nation's capital to the fifty state
capitals can affect the influence of specific special interest groups,
but as long as the political means is used to reallocate the
resources in the marketplace, the process of government expropria-
tion from the many to the few will continue. For example, enter-
prise zones and many of the co-financing techniques used by the
city of Indianapolis are considered programs consistent with the
New Federalism. Yet, as this Article already has discussed, such
programs thrive on special interest groups' ability to capture the
use of the political means for their own benefit.
What then is the significance of the New Federalism? Besides
the rhetorical appeal of the appearance of local, popular decision-
making, the New Federalism is an effective method of transferring
the power associated with the political means. New Deal programs
concentrate political power at the national level by way of the fed-
eral government. By virtue of federal government sponsorship, pro-
grams and regulations have a uniform, national application. This
means that "liberal New Deal" interests enjoying the support of a
high concentration of legislative power and votes in the heavily
time, decide what can be "got away with," and how, and who is to do it; and the electo-
rate votes according to their prescriptions.
Id. Nock's position could be supported in another light by John Kenneth Galbraith. Gal-
braith argues that the state possesses access to the means of power and that the state,
through conditional power, gets people to respond to or believe in concepts that serve those
in power without accurately portraying the real world. See J. GALBRAITH, THE ANATOMY OF
POWER (1983).
149. Nock makes a further comment on the political process and its response to the
rhetoric of returning government to the people.
Republicanism permits the individual to persuade himself that the state is his creation,
that state action is his action, that when it expresses itself it expresses him, and when
it is glorified he is glorified . . . . Lincoln's phrase, "of the people, by the people, for
the people" was probably the most effective stroke of propaganda ever made in behalf
of republican state prestige.
A. NocK, supra note 117, at 45.
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populated, industrial states can be effected through the federal leg-
islative process. Programs that capture the benefits of this political
means are assured of no competition from individual states that
might wish to reject a program. The individual states are not
allowed to reject a program because the underlying problem
addressed by the legislation is deemed to be of national, rather
than state or local, concern. Given the political makeup of the fed-
eral government, it would be perfectly logical for the conservative
special interest groups that support President Reagan to favor a
shift in power over the political means from the national to the
state level. In this way conservative special interests could employ
the political means at the state and local levels in those states and
communities in which they are well represented, even if at the na-
tional level they would lack sufficient votes to overturn or replace
New Deal programs that they oppose. Thus, the key distinction
between the New Deal and the New Federalism approaches is New
Federalism's ability to shift political power to a forum more
favorable to those special interest groups aligned with the current
administration.
Although the rhetoric of New Federalism paints a picture dif-
ferent from that of the New Deal, it is evident that there is less to
this alleged difference than meets the eye. Fundamentally, both
political approaches seek to allocate resources according to the
political means rather than the economic means. The result of the
New Federalism, therefore, is not to change the relationship of the
state to the individual, but rather merely to change the identity of
the special interests likely to benefit from the exercise of the
state's power.
This view of the political process currently supporting co-
financing arrangements calls for an assessment of whether or not
the political and economic dynamics of these programs ever actu-
ally can lead to an emergence of the prosperous urban environment
necessary for fueling long-term economic growth, job creation, and
capital formation. Jane Jacobs argues in her recent book, Cities
And The Wealth of Nations, that government loan, grant, and
subsidy programs can provide only short-term and short-lived ben-
efits.150 Furthermore, the spending on development loans, grants,
and subsidies is in itself the entire benefit to be expected from
these programs. 151 Thus, according to Jacobs, these programs can
150. See J. JACOBS, CITIES AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 93-124 (1984).
151. Id.
1987]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
play little part in the economic life of the revitalizing city other
than that of temporarily reducing unemployment and alleviating
poverty. 152 Examining the reasons behind this assessment of co-
financing programs is necessary in order to appreciate its implica-
tions for formulating new approaches to urban redevelopment.
The economic strength of an urban center and its extended
regions depends on the vitality of their import-replacing capacity.
As described in the first part of this Article, import replacement is
an essential part of long-term growth potential and capital forma-
tion. Cities are dynamic and not static; they must respond to
changes in economic circumstances. Merely granting government
sponsored incentives or transplanting industrial factories to new
locations cannot turn an economically weak area into a prospering,
import-replacing city region.153
In order to highlight the significance of import-replacing activ-
ities, Jacobs outlines the role that imports play in the city econ-
omy.154 First, cities use their imports. That is, imports are con-
sumed for uses within the city region. 55 Second, imports to a city
region demonstrate the earning power of its export work. This is
true to the extent that imports are purchased with funds earned
by the city's export economy rather than with mere loans, grants,
or subsidies made available from sources outside the region.5 The
source of the city's import funds is crucial, because only through
developing its export productivity can a city nurture the dynamic
interaction of suppliers and producers that is all-important to its
economy. 157 Third, imports serve as candidates for replacement by
local production. 58 But, as Jacobs points out, replacement cannot
occur without the foundation of dynamic interaction that first
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 119-122.
155. Id. at 119.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 119. Jacobs clarifies this point by offering the following comparison:
Once we understand why unearned imports, whatever other usefulness they may have,
are beside the point for catalyzing real economic development, we can understand, also,
why the remittances that migrant workers send back to their poor home regions do so
little to transform economic life there. Not having been earned right there, by city
work, these benefits can play no part in economic life other than temporarily alleviat-
ing poverty. It is the same with all transfer payments from rich to poor regions. They
alleviate poverty but inherently can do nothing to overcome the causes of poverty.
Id. at 122.
158. Id. at 119.
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must be laid by the process of earning the imports.159 In short,
"development cannot be given. It has to be done. It is a process,
not a collection of capital goods.' 6 0
In order to explain this process better, Jacobs illustrates her
analysis with the example of northern Georgia and its ability in
recent years to attract numerous transplant industries from other
parts of the country. The transplant industries have added jobs
and money to the regional economy, but Jacobs argues that they
have done little to transform the Atlanta area into a truly prosper-
ous import-replacing region. 61 Rather than encouraging import re-
placement, most of the transplant industries only have added to
the servicing and distribution functions of the Atlanta region. The
reason for this result is illustrated by Lockheed's Marietta works,
which is one of the largest manufacturing complexes in the entire
southeastern United States.16 2
Lockheed was founded as a fledgling enterprise based in Los
Angeles.16 3 During its early years, the company relied heavily on
local suppliers and businesses to furnish equipment and to help
develop new ideas and sources of capital for the new enterprise.'64
The local city economy also provided employees and consumers for
Lockheed's products and services. 65
By the time Lockheed was able to move to northern Georgia
many years later, the company was in many ways self-sufficient.1 6
It supplied many of its own items, services, and skills that formerly
had been furnished by independent suppliers in the Los Angeles
city region. 67 The company's marketing, servicing, and communi-
cations lines were so well developed that Lockheed could have
placed a major manufacturing facility in almost any location. 68
Marietta, Georgia was the chosen location, but the facility trans-
planted there was tied to the major enterprise still headed in Los
Angeles. 6 9 In short, Lockheed's Marietta facility provided jobs,
but it did not interact with the local city region as a source of sup-
159. Id.
160. Id. (emphasis original).
161. Id. at 94-96.
162. Id. at 94.
163. Id. at 95.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 95-96.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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plies and services in the way that Lockheed originally had in Los
Angeles. Lockheed did not help support the local producers of its
requirements and thus failed to reproduce in northern Georgia,
even in microcosm, the sort of economic growth that it had in-
spired in Los Angeles.170
In another example Jacobs discusses the Tennessee Valley Au-
thority (TVA) and its inability to stimulate the emergence of an
import-replacing city despite the investment of tremendous
amounts of government money and resources.1 7 1 She generally
applauds the TVA administrators' skill and success in executing
their mission and does not fault TVA itself for the continued pov-
erty in the region.172 Instead, she finds the fault to be inherent in
the use of government loan, grant, and subsidy programs. 173 The
many projects the TVA undertook in the region produced project-
related jobs, but created no significant numbers or kinds of city
jobs necessary for the accumulation of excess capital.174 The re-
gion, rather than developing local producers for local needs, con-
tinued to depend on importing almost all its needs. 7 Further-
more, nearly all development continued to be financed with capital
generated from outside rather than from within the region.17 6
Thus, the government-related subsidies generated by the TVA
170. Id. at 96.
171. Id. at 110-23. Jacobs describes the TVA efforts as attempts to create an artificial
city region. She also points out that Knoxville, Tennessee, a city in the middle of the TVA
area and home of the University of Tennessee, never was able to capitalize on the influx of
TVA money. Knoxville never emerged as a successful or prosperous import-replacing city.
She also notes that the region itself contained abundant natural resources and that the
native people had a history of self-reliance and hard work. Furthermore, because the area
had not developed as part of the earlier plantation economy of the South, many farmers in
the region owned their own land. Despite all these strengths and the influx of enormous
amounts of federal money for the TVA, no import-replacing city emerged.
172. Id. at 110-23.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 114.
175. Id.
176. Id. Jacobs also uses the example of massive subsidy programs in southern Italy as
a comparison to the TVA experience. Id. at 120-23. Historically, there has been a large gap
between the wealth, prosperity, and job opportunities of the industrial regions of northern
Italy and the impoverished, agricultural regions of southern Italy. Since the 1950s, the Ital-
ian government has provided loans, grants, and subsidies to build roads, power plants,
schools, and housing to attract industries, and to subsidize agriculture in order to aid the
southern part of the country. Id. at 120-21. Industrial transplants were located at Bari and
close to Naples. Although this massive Italian effort produced certain benefits, as did the
TVA program, the long-term results have done little to decrease the basic poverty in the
region, and the gap between northern and southern Italy is said to have increased over the
time period in question. Id. at 121.
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temporarily helped to reduce unemployment and alleviate poverty.
Rather than fostering import-replacing activities, however, subsi-
dies merely provided additional funds for local people to import
goods, services, and capital from outside the region. 17 As long as
the region remains without significant import-replacing activities,
it will need continued subsidies to maintain its current economic
standard of living.
Jacobs' analysis and examples have important implications for
the use of co-financing arrangements in the drive for urban revi-
talization. The use of public assistance or financing in redevelop-
ment projects would seem to require, at the very least, a selection
of projects consistent with the goals of achieving or enhancing a
city's import-replacing ability. This means that the projects must
do more than provide an influx of short-term jobs and outside cap-
ital infusion. They must stimulate a dynamic interaction between
local suppliers and producers that will enhance the city's export
economy. Only when the city earns its own importing funds and
develops a diversified and versatile economy can it hope to achieve
long-term economic success.
The current range of co-financing projects that some cities
have undertaken hardly seems worthy of the task at hand. The
subsidized development of downtown office buildings and hotels, or
the desire to preserve historic structures by turning them into fast
food and retail centers, is hardly the type of activity likely to bring
forth long-term gains for a local city economy.'78 In the short run,
177. Id. at 110-23.
178. See generally MacArthur, Give Me Old-Time America Without The Gloss, Wall
St. J., Jan 14, 1986, at 32, col. 3. In this editorial MacArthur assaults the current trends in
historic preservation and downtown redevelopment that focus on every city trying to
become a tourist attraction or shopping and eating center. He starts by considering this
process in Savannah, Georgia and then addresses the broader problem as he sees it sweeping
across the United States.
With the help of local bond issues and tax credits, politicians will claim victory in the
fight against economic decline as they change the local landscape into a tourist attrac-
tion. The emphasis on essentially cosmetic improvements in this or that part of town
results from a failure to imagine the future, as well as a false sense of American history.
It also tends to mask the real economic problems we confront, and demeans our culture
with artificial substitutes. Our commercially innovative culture has not resulted in
beautiful cities: Detroit, Cleveland, Chicago and Los Angeles have been wonderfully
productive, but they are not aesthetically pleasing in any European sense. With Ameri-
can ingenuity has come immense wealth, great tolerance for ethnic and cultural diver-
sity and relatively widespread democracy and social mobility. Which brings me back to
Savannah, a pretty but by no means beautiful city. Savannah's rise to importance had
everything to do with its value as a port.. . . But what will become of Savannah if
employment from its port, for example, is gradually supplanted by a tourist economy?
1987]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
such projects will provide project-oriented jobs, as did the TVA,
and will generate a series of minimum wage retail and service jobs.
There also will be the new or renovated buildings for local politi-
cians to point to as signs of progress, and an appearance of urban
vitality will result from the short-term construction activity. With-
out a strong import-replacing economy, however, the new buildings
merely may be shifting uses between different parts of the city or
region, rather than fostering long-term economic growth. And
while it may be a matter of pride to local residents to enhance the
downtown skyline at the expense of the suburbs or other potential
business locations, it becomes questionable whether such projects
merit the use of public funds and resources.
For cities facing a decline in their industrial and commercial
manufacturing bases, it hardly seems possible that economic pros-
perity will result from replacing skilled jobs and export capacity
with a nonexport economy based on restaurants, shops, hotels, and
numerous downtown attractions similar to those springing up like
clones all across America.179 Nonetheless, for political reasons it
seems that co-financing activities have taken primarily this
direction. These activities, when well orchestrated, can produce
real and necessary changes for a local economy. As was illustrated
by the Lockheed and TVA examples, however, the successful
transplanting of specific industrial facilities to a city region or the
use of government loans, grants, and subsidies cannot create a suc-
cessful, import-replacing region. Without the import replacement
prerequisite, a city region has no foundation for a lasting period of
economic growth and prosperity.
IV. THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONSTRAINTS ON Co-FINANCING
Up to this point in the Article, discussion has focused on
describing the nature of co-financing arrangements and the politi-
cal and economic dynamics of co-financing activities. Beyond the
realm of descriptive analysis, however, co-financing activity
requires philosophical evaluation. A philosophical evaluation is im-
portant to this Article's discussion because the analysis of co-
financing activities raises a fundamental philosophical question
How can it survive aesthetically or commercially if no one can imagine anything other
than businesses paying the minimum wage? How will social mobility be funded if the
principal reason for Savannah's existance becomes the entertainment of pensioners on
vacation from Akron and San Jose?
Id.
179. See generally J. JACOBS, supra note 150; MacArthur, supra note 178.
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about the effect of these programs on traditional notions of
individual liberty and the relationship between the state and pri-
vate enterprise in a capitalist society.180 This part of the Article
will focus on philosophical constraints on co-financing activities.
These constraints have two primary foundations that are useful in
a philosophical evaluation. The first foundation reflects an under-
standing of the proper and limited role of government in a capital-
ist society, and the second involves the normative role of law in
facilitating social order.
A capitalist society, in which private individuals own the
means of production, provides a framework for the protection of
individual liberty. 181 Individual liberty in this context refers to a
view of social relationships that provides for a sphere of personal
autonomy over one's own thoughts and actions free from outside
coercive interference. 182 This sphere of personal autonomy is not
limitless, however, and the concept of individual freedom in a mar-
ket economy or laissez-faire social organization requires govern-
mental restriction of antisocial behavior that, if left unchecked,
would disintegrate social cooperation and civilization.8 3 In the
180. See Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REv. 1685 (1976). Although Kennedy focuses on the difference between an individualist and
an altruist view of law, his overriding theme stresses that all law is philosophy. Kennedy's
discussion of individualism, however, is not a discussion of the classical liberal model of
individual liberty. The classical liberal concern for individual liberty includes moral and
-natural law principles not fully shared by the Benthamite Utilitarians that Kennedy dis-
cusses. See also Lanversin, Land Policy: Is There A Middle Way?, 3 URB. L. & POL'Y 229
(1980). Lanversin argues that land policy varies with each country and is a function of polit-
ical ideology because land rights or the lack thereof are defined by law and because govern-
ment takes part in this process. Because land policy is universally political or ideological,
one must consider these factors in evaluating given programs. See also Darin-Drabkin &
Darin, Let the State Control!, 3 URB. L. & POL'Y 217 (1980) (presenting an example of
Marxist philosophy applied to land policy).
181. See M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, at 1-36. Capitalism is a necessary but not suffi-
cient condition for the existence and preservation of individual liberty. Id. at 10. "The kind
of economic organization that provides economic freedom directly, namely, competitive cap-
italism, also promotes political freedom because it separates economic power from political
power and in this way enables the one to offset the other." Id. at 9.
182. See F. HAYEK, supra note 16, at 13; see also M. ROTHBARD, THE ETHICS OF Lm-
ERTY 35-43 (1983) (discussing the natural right to seek interpersonal relations and voluntary
exchanges); M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, at 14-21. According to Friedman:
The fundamental threat to freedom is power to coerce, be it in the hands of a monarch,
a dictator, an oligarchy, or a momentary majority. The preservation of freedom
requires the elimination of such concentration of power to the fullest possible extent
and the dispersal and distribution of whatever power cannot be eliminated-a system
of checks and balances.
Id. at 15.
183. See L. VON MIsEs, HUMAN AcTION, supra note 17, at 179-87; F. HAYEK, THE CON-
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absence of a commitment to anarchy, the difficulty lies in deter-
mining the extent to which government properly can restrict an
individual's behavior while still preserving a free society based on
individual liberty. This issue, of course, has been debated exten-
sively elsewhere.18 4 The purpose of this Article, therefore, is not to
attempt a restatement of the entire theoretical underpinnings of
limited government, but rather to determine whether co-financing
activities are beyond the bounds of legitimate state action.
From this philosophical perspective co-financing activities, as
currently conceived, do run afoul of traditional classical liberal
notions of government's legitimate role in a society based on the
preservation of free enterprise and individual liberty. This is not to
say that classical liberals would consider all governmental attempts
to foster urban revitalization impermissible. To the contrary, there
are ways in which co-financing arrangements could be made more
acceptable to classical liberals, and these will be addressed in the
recommendations section of this Article. Before addressing recom-
mendations for structuring future co-financing programs, however,
one must understand the philosophical problems with current
activities.
The first philosophical problem is the substitution of the polit-
ical means for the economic means. This process, as so aptly
articulated by Albert Jay Nock in Our Enemy, The State, was il-
lustrated in this Article's discussion of the politics and economics
of co-financing. 185 The harm associated with this substitution is
precisely that it removes the decisionmaking process of resource
STITUTION OF LIBERTY 11-21 (1960). Within the confines of a free society, the state can be a
legitimate collective vehicle for protecting the individual's liberty from the coercive interfer-
ence of others. Id. See also F. HAYEK, supra note 17, at 82-83. The idea of government as a
protector of individual freedom, however, does not mean that whatever the government does
in the name of this protection is to be considered proper. Hitler may have gained power and
acted in a strictly constitutional manner, but this would not make his rule "right." Id.
184. See, e.g., R. EPSTEIN, supra note 69 (arguing for limited government and address-
ing the theory behind it); M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 17; M. FRIEDMAN & R. FRIEDMAN, supra
note 17; F. HAYEK, supra note 17; D. HumE, ESSAYs-MoRAL, POLITICAL, AND LITERARY 87-96
(2d ed. 1985); J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 53-106 (1975); R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA
(1974) (defending individual liberty and seeking to define the proper role of the state in a
society that values the individual as the basis of freedom); L. VON MISEs, HUMAN ACTION,
supra note 17; L. VON MISES, PLANNING FOR FREEDOM, supra note 17. See also A. SMITH,
LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 200-458 (1978). This part of Smith's book deals with justice
and the forms of legal relationships between the individual and the state and considers
different forms of government. This book, which is based on notes from Smith's lectures on
jurisprudence at the University of Glasgow, also presents an interesting look at Adam Smith
as legal philosopher.
185. See A. NOCK, supra note 117; see also supra text accompanying notes 117-79.
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allocation from the marketplace, which reflects individual value
determinations, and replaces marketplace decisionmaking with
special interest groups' valuations effected by the groups' captur-
ing the power of the state. In this way, the state becomes the
means by which one group of people legally can exploit other mem-
bers of society. The political means thus allows special interest
groups to use government power to fulfill personal gains that indi-
viduals or groups cannot obtain in the marketplace.
Because classical liberalism prefers that resource allocations
be made by individuals acting through the marketplace, attempts
to circumvent the market process by government intervention are
discouraged unless such intervention is required to assure individ-
ual human dignity and liberty. 8" While it may be true that govern-
ment programs providing individuals with minimal levels of health
care, shelter, and food are a legitimate basis for market interven-
tion, it is hard to see how such a justification supports broadly
based subsidies for one real estate developer, project, or city over
another.
In short, classical liberals' first objection to co-financing
reduces to a rather simple principle. If Indianapolis or any other
city is really worth investing in, then private developers will make
that investment without having taxpayers subsidize their cost and
risk. To the extent that private investors are not willing to invest
in Indianapolis or another city, they will invest in another location
or project, which presumably will be more valuable because they
are willing to invest without a subsidy. After all, hotels, shopping
centers, office buildings, and restaurants are not like dams or air-
ports. The former are the types of investments that private enter-
prise always has invested in. Thus, the primary objective of many
current co-financing arrangements is not to encourage activities
that otherwise would not occur, but rather to encourage these
activities in locations apparently undesirable for the investment.
Because these co-financing subsidies result in misallocations of
resources-allocations contrary to those determined by individuals
186. See Malloy, supra note 13, at 163-77. In this article, I argue that the economic,
political, and moral philosophy of Adam Smith and of recent economists such has Friedrich
Hayek and Milton Friedman supports the conclusion that classical liberals' view of free
market economics includes normative principles based on morality, natural law, and inalien-
able rights. Furthermore, I argue that the useful economist, in order to act consistently with
classical liberalism, must use economics in a way that upholds individual human dignity and
liberty. From this perspective, government is organized for the purpose of protecting indi-
vidual human dignity and liberty. Government action, therefore, is justified in a limited
capacity when such action is required to protect this liberty.
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in the marketplace-they are objectionable.
Classical liberals' second objection to co-financing is that in a
capitalist society, in which the means of production are owned by
private individuals rather than by the state, promoting a program
that results in governmental ownership, in one form or another, of
many of a city's most prominent office, hotel, and retail properties
is objectionable for two reasons. First, the result eliminates the
impartial decisionmaking ability of local city officials, and second,
it covertly reduces the ability of independent private capital to act
as a check on government power.
Local city officials lose their ability to make impartial deci-
sions regarding the direction of future growth when they already
have staked millions of dollars in public funds and their own polit-
ical futures on specific downtown projects. Having invested, for
instance, in a particular shopping center or office building complex,
the city has a vested interest in assuring some degree of financial
success for the project, even if that means preventing future entry
of more desirable, competitive private projects. 187 Likewise, assur-
ing a project's success also may mean investing in additional subsi-
dies to support already "sunk funds" if the market response to the
project is less than was anticipated. An additional consequence of
these subsidies, even when the city does not block market entry, is
that the unsubsidized private developer may be unable to compete
in the market as a direct result of the comparative advantage its
competitors gain by their use of public funds. In any of these situa-
tions, the problem is clear. Allowing a city government to own
profit-making enterprises that compete with similar existing or po-
tential private enterprises and expecting impartiality is akin to
putting Exxon Corporation in charge of the American oil industry
and allowing it to oversee the activities of all its competitors, real
or perceived.
The ability of private capital to act as a check on government
power is a function of private capital's diversity and independence
from the government. In a system of free enterprise, diverse indi-
viduals within the society are allowed to accumulate wealth and
use this wealth to support individual challenges to the exercise of
187. See Gruen, Public/Private Projects-A Better Way for Downtowns, URB. LAND,
Aug. 1986, at 4. This very action has been taken in St. Paul, Minnesota, where city officials
used their influence with the regional planning agency to block approval of a suburban
shopping mall that would compete with a downtown shopping facility in which the City had
an economic interest.
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government power.18 8 In this way, private sources of wealth place
resources that can serve as a check against the state beyond the
state's reach. 189 To a certain extent, co-financing activities covertly
reduce this private source of capital able to check the power of the
state. This result occurs because co-financing can reduce diversity
of wealth by subsidizing select developers and preventing market
entry by others and because co-financing reduces the independence
of private capital by linking the selected developer's interests to
those of the city. For these reasons, co-financing activities again
are objectionable.
A third classical liberal objection to co-financing is that a fun-
damental prerequisite to efficient resource allocation in a market
oriented economy is the availability of good information concern-
ing the relative costs of alternative actions. Philosophically, this
availability is important because the expression of individual lib-
erty through the marketplace is based in part on the premise that
people are thinking, reasoning beings who will make rational eco-
nomic choices based on the information available to them. °90 Thus,
it is necessary to assess co-financing from the point of view of its
current ability to provide the public with adequate information.
As this Article earlier discussed, co-financing activities benefit
from the use of the political means, which allows funds to be raised
from a much wider population than that likely to receive the pri-
mary benefit of a particular project. The very process of mixing the
sources of public funds and playing local, state, and federal income
sources one against the other makes it nearly impossible for the
average urban resident to assess the value of a given project rela-
tive to its cost. This process is undesirable because it obscures
market information and hinders individual decisionmaking and be-
cause the lack of good information against which to judge their
188. See M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 7-21 (1962, reissued 1982); Malloy,
supra note 13, at 168-71.
189. See supra note 188.
190. See L. VON MISEs, HUMAN ACTION, supra note 17. Von Mises describes economics
as the science of all human action and states that human action is necessarily always ra-
tional. Id. at 19. See also Kuttner, The Poverty of Economics, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb.
1985, at 74. Although this article is critical of the trends that favor model building in eco-
nomics, it provides a good analysis of basic economic approaches. It also argues that eco-
nomics, of whatever branch, is basically an ideologically charged undertaking. Id. at 83. Rel-
evant to the point at issue, the article refers to a position taken by Milton Friedman in his
ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS. In that essay Friedman argues that the information and
rationality assumptions underlying economics do not have to be empirically true so long as
they lead to an internally consistent model that is not refuted by data. Id. at 79 (citing M.
FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS (1953)).
1987]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
performance makes government officials less accountable.
In addition to these objections to co-financing based primarily
on considerations of the proper and limited role of government in a
free society, there are grounds for objection based on the norma-
tive role of law in facilitating social order. The normative objection
to co-financing relies on the notion that in a free society affirma-
tive enforcement of all laws at all times is impractical, if not
impossible, and that limited law enforcement resources require a
legal system to depend substantially on voluntary compliance.19 In
order for this normative acceptance of laws to occur, a significant
segment of the general populace must view the enforcing state and
its operative legal system as legitimate. 92
Professor Michael Hoeflich has considered this problem of
normative acceptance of the law in conjunction with voluntary
compliance under the federal tax laws. 9 ' His analysis reveals that
it is possible for a set of legal rules, such as the tax code, to lose its
normative value over time. As these rules lose their normative
value, people no longer feel that they ought to pay their taxes, but
rather treat the tax laws as a game in which they match wits
against the government bureaucrats.194 In part, Professor Hoe-
flich's observed decline in voluntary compliance under the tax laws
can be attributed to a popular perception that the tax code, as
structured, long has been merely a compilation of special interest
benefits and burdens rather than a principled approach to sharing
the costs of government.195 As a result of this perception, the nor-
191. See Malloy, supra note 13, at 166-68; see also Kornhauser, The Great Image of
Authority, 36 STAN. L. REV. 349, 353-57 (1984) (arguing that law helps shape human conduct
and thus serves a normative function); Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Eco-
nomic Theory of Law, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1015 (1978) (describing law as multi-dimensional
with moral, social, political, and economic aspects); see generally L. FULLER, THE MORALITY
OF LAW 33-94 (rev. ed. 1969) (arguing that governments' failure to observe certain guidelines
in expecting people to obey the law would lead to reduced normative acceptance of the legal
structure); H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 83-114, 133-37 (1961) (discussing the internal
point of view and how law becomes an internalized standard for assessing conduct); J.
SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 190-91 (1950) (describing morality and
one's sense of justice as important factors in the evaluation of the merits of a particular
social or economic structure and therefore in the legitimization of that structure).
192. Malloy, supra note 13, at 166.
193. See Hoeflich, Of Reason, Gamesmanship, and Taxes: A Jurisprudential and
Theoretical Approach to the Problem of Voluntary Compliance, 2 Am. J. TAx POL'Y 9
(1983) (viewing problems of tax compliance creatively and innovatively in relation to theo-
ries of gamesmanship and jurisprudence).
194. Id. at 37-65 (giving examples of "playing the game").
195. Id. at 9-88. "A recent English commentator on this problem of multipurpose tax
systems has remarked that such a hodgepodge of conflicting interests and purposes cannot
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mative acceptance of the tax laws is reduced, and this, of course,
leads to reduction in the tendency towards law abidingness. 19 In
the broader context of the law in general, this process ultimately
can lead to disintegration of social order when the legal structure
no longer is viewed as legitimate.
This analysis is equally applicable to considerations of co-
financing activities. For instance, a typical response to objections
to co-financing activities that use various public funds to en-
courage development in downtown Indianapolis is simply: "So
what if Indianapolis gets a few dollars? Chicago, New York, Louis-
ville, and innumerable other cities also get a few dollars, maybe
even more than their fair share." In other words, the political and
economic dynamics of co-financing appear to make co-financing ac-
tivities subject to the same normative problems as the tax laws. To
the extent that co-financing arrangements become perceived
merely as commitments to satisfying special political interest
groups rather than as principled approaches to genuine social
problems, they will lose their normative acceptance. As these legal
arrangements lose their normative acceptance, the legitimacy of
co-financing activities and, ultimately, the legitimacy of the politi-
cal structure that supports such interest-oriented legislation will be
called into question.
Thus, it becomes clear, at least to the classical liberal, that co-
financing activities raise important, fundamental, philosophical
questions. The degree to which government should be involved in
private market activities and the degree to which these activities
affect normative principles necessary for social order are both
called into question.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Having described co-financing's nature and considered both its
political and economic dynamics, together with its philosophical
constraints, this Article now will consider recommendations for
future action in this important area of real estate law and urban
development. Classical liberal philosophy provides a useful ap-
proach to the need for recommendations because it provides a
method of economic analysis that encompasses notions of natural
possibly succeed in convincing those who must bear the tax burden of the tax system's
inherent worth and fairness." Id. at 12 (citing H. MONROE, INTOLERABLE INQUISITION?
REFLECTIONS ON THE LAW OF TAx (1981)).
196. Hoeflich, supra note 193, at 9-23.
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law, inalienable rights, and the commitment of limited government
to supplying and protecting the moral and normative imperatives
of human dignity.19 7 In an earlier article, I argued that classical
liberalism is distinguishable from utilitarian analysis and cost-ben-
efit economics because of classical liberalism's strong moral tradi-
tions rooted in the philosophy of Adam Smith.19 It is not my ob-
jective to re-argue these points here, but it is important to
understand that classical liberalism does not take an amoral ap-
proach to economic analysis like that used and advocated by many
other economists; nor does it simply adhere to a principle of wealth
maximization as the ultimate morality of the marketplace. 99 Class-
197. Malloy, supra note 13.
198. Id. I contend that Smith's most famous book, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, cannot
be read in isolation from his earlier work, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS. Malloy,
supra note 13, at 167. Together, these works reveal that Smith's theory of the marketplace
was based on an underlying belief that self-interest and happiness within society depend
upon high standards of moral conduct. Id. Smith believed in natural law rights and was a
moral philosopher; he was not completely a cost and benefit utilitarian. Id. at 168 & n.22-24.
Modern economists such as Hayek and Friedman raise these same concerns in their writing
when they reflect on the normative role of law and the protection of individual liberty. See
M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 17; F. HAYEK, LAW LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 17.
Hayek's three-volume work explores in detail many of the philosophical and moral issues
first discussed in F. HAYEK, supra note 16.
199. Judge Richard Posner, while sharing some of classical liberalism's economic prin-
ciples, is an example of a scholar who has done much to develop a combined theory of law
and economics, yet has failed to retain a sense of moral judgment free of his simple utilita-
rian market theory. As a result, Posner's analysis has become too confined by amoral princi-
ples of wealth maximization and utilitarian cost-benefit analysis. He thus departs from the
moral underpinnings of Adam Smith's theory and, therefore, is a philosopher of a different
kind than the classical liberal, even though both employ similar economic methods. Posner's
views on a wide range of subjects appear in his books, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1986)
and THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1983).
According to Posner, the development of an economic analysis of law emerged from two
branches of eighteenth-century scholarship. See Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Econom-
ics in Law, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 281-84 (1979). One branch originated with Adam Smith
and focused on the laws regulating the "economic system." Id. at 281. The other branch of
scholarship emerged from the work of Jeremy Bentham and focused on an economic analy-
sis of nonmarket behavior such as accidents, crimes, marriage, pollution, and the legal and
political processes themselves. Id. at 282. It seems that when Posner considered these two
branches of thought, he selected Benthamite utilitarianism and lost track of Smith's moral
and economic philosophy. A current restatement of Posner's belief in wealth maximization
as the morality of the marketplace illustrates that, like utilitariansim, his approach does not
recognize inalienable rights and is at least in part contrary to classical liberal notions of
individual liberty. See Posner, Wealth Maximization Revisited, 2 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL'Y 85 (1985).
For additional criticism of Posner and his economic analysis of law, see Baker, The
Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 J. PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 3-48 (1975) (identifying
biases in the Posner approach); Kronman, Wealth Maximization As Normative Principal, 9
J. LEGAL STUD. 227 (1980) (discussing Posner's normative principle of wealth maximization);
Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451
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ical liberalism requires a constant and continuous dialogue on the
subject of human dignity, which dialogue may lead to the determi-
nation of limited government's proper role in the protection of in-
dividual liberty within the context of an organized social
structure. 00
Classical liberalism, therefore, does not dictate the complete
impermissibility of co-financing activities. To the contrary, classi-
cal liberalism provides a framework for taking all the factors dis-
cussed in this Article and using them to formulate a perspective or
approach to co-financing that is consistent with the essential
requirements of a free market economy. A free market economy, in
the classical liberal sense, is concerned both with market efficiency
and with the preservation of individual liberty through a moral
and limited approach to government. What follows, then, are rec-
ommendations for future co-financing activity that are consistent
with classical liberal views on the relationship between law and
economics.
For classical liberals, government's proper and legitimate role
is limited to engaging in those activities necessary to correct
instances of market failure and to protect fundamental human
rights essential to the concept of individual liberty.201 In this con-
text, government arguably has a proper role in co-financing activi-
ties. Permissible co-financing activities, however, must comply
with two essential requirements. First, the projects selected for co-
financing assistance must be of a type not typically produced in
the private marketplace. That is to say, market failure exists be-
cause natural market forces do not provide for adequate invest-
(1974); Michelman, A Comment on Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CH.
L. REv. 307 (1979) (describing wealth maximization as a principle biased in favor of the
wealthy).
200. It is important to understand that moral principles do not have to be based on
any given religion or source. Moral principles for classical liberal thought can be found in
notions of natural law and involve concepts of right and wrong sanctioned by theological,
logical, and biological theories. See H. MENCKEN, TREATISE ON RIGHT AND WRONG 14 (1977).
Mencken asserts that morality has existed among all peoples in one form or another. Id. at
5. Additionally, people fundamentally agree that murder, theft, trespass, adultery, and false
witness are examples of antisocial and immoral behavior. Id. at 6-8. Despite this general
agreement on certain basic moral norms, the authority for individuals' moral beliefs can
differ considerably over time and place. Id. at 8-62. Mencken described the three theories of
morality as follows: (1) theological, which is based in religious doctrine; (2) logical, which
stems from philosophical inquiries and seeks to justify human conduct on purely logical
grounds, rather than on the will of the gods; and (3) biological, which originates in Darwin's
work on THE DESCENT OF MAN, wherein man's moral passions are linked to instinct and are
alleged to be observable in many lower animals. Id. at 1-62.
201. See generally Malloy, supra note 13.
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ment in the desired type of project. Second, the projects selected
must serve a function essential to preserving the human dignity of
individuals within the society. All of this must be accomplished
within a context that nonetheless supports the continued function-
ing of the private market while assuring the potential for the
growth of more dynamic, import-replacing city regions.
On the basis of these general criteria, many current co-financ-
ing activities seem impermissible. This conclusion is true even
though a legitimate role exists for government to play in promoting
urban redevelopment. Subsidizing shopping centers, hotels, office
buildings, and restaurants, for instance, hardly is compatible with
limiting government co-financing activities to the types of projects
that are the subject of inadequate investment in the private mar-
ket. Private enterprise always has invested in shopping centers, ho-
tels, office buildings, and restaurants, and these projects continue
to be the focus of substantial private investment. Likewise, it
seems difficult to contend seriously that subsidizing these particu-
lar types of projects is necessary to assure the protection of human
dignity and individual liberty. To the contrary, people living in the
street without food, shelter, or minimal medical care hardly are in
need of room space at a luxury hotel or of additional high-priced
clothing boutiques. 02
Supporters of co-financing for shopping centers, hotels, office
buildings, and restaurants typically respond with counterargu-
ments to these challenges. First, they argue that despite continued
private investment in these types of real estate projects, the pri-
vate marketplace is unable to assure that these projects are located
properly. Co-financing proponents assert that underinvestment in
the downtown urban center is an indication of market failure. This
lack of investment, however, is not market failure. The private
202. Depending on the source of data used, 250,000 to 4,000,000 homeless people live
in America. See Homelessness: Demographics, Causes, and Cures In A Nutshell, URB.
LAND, May 1986, at 32. Despite the increasing problem of the homeless, under the Reagan
administration the federal government is providing little help. The Administration prefers
to identify the problem as a local problem in need of local answers. Id. at 33. See also
Karlen, Agrest, Robins & Greenberg, Homeless Kids: 'Forgotten Faces', NEWSWEEK, Jan. 6,
1986, at 20; Morganthau, Agrest, Greenberg, Doherty & Raine, Abandoned, NEWSWEEK, Jan.
6, 1986, at 14; Alter, Greenberg & Doherty, The Homeless: Out in the Code, NEWSWEEK,
Dec. 16, 1985, at 22; Caleca, Indy's Homeless, Indianapolis Star, March 16, 1985, at Fl, Cl.
The estimate is that Indianapolis has between 700 and 3000 homeless. Id. at F-4 col. 1.
These homeless are made up of a variety of people including the traditional image of the old
wino or bag lady, former mental patients, and the new homeless: former factory workers,
farmers, and college educated professionals who have been left behind in the economic re-
covery. Id. at F-1, col. 2-3.
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marketplace is allocating resources to the production of the very
types of projects the city seeks to subsidize. The location question
is merely a disagreement as to where private capital should be in-
vested. Investors using their own resources are bound to seek the
best return for their investment. Their choice of location, there-
fore, should be at least as good as, if not better than, the location
choices of politicians seeking to spend someone else's money.
A city confronting a decline in its downtown urban center
should examine the political and economic reasons for this decline.
It may be due to excessive taxation or zoning restrictions or to a
decline in police efforts to control crime and provide for safety on
the streets. These reasons for decline, however, require political
attention to addressing these particular problems. Co-financing as
a mechanism for subsidizing particular special interests and se-
lected real estate projects cannot lead to the creation of a sus-
tained and vibrant urban economy because it does little or nothing
to enhance the city's import-replacing capacity.
A second challenge to criticism of current co-financing strate-
gies is based on the asserted value of "trickle down" job creation.
Investing in downtown shopping centers, hotels, office buildings,
and restaurants is supposed to create job opportunities for the
unskilled and difficult to employ. The development of such
projects undoubtedly generates a number of unskilled and low pay-
ing jobs, but there are several problems with the asserted value of
subsidizing such efforts. First and foremost is that these subsidies
suffer from all the problems associated with Jane Jacobs' analysis
of transplant industries and government subsidies.20 3 As previously
discussed, transplant industries and government subsidies may be
able to provide temporary relief for the unemployed or the impo-
verished, but they can neither develop nor sustain an import-re-
placing city. Thus, they fail to create the dynamic urban economy
that is necessary for true long-term economic growth and prosper-
ity. 04 Without the ultimate development of an enhanced import-
replacing city economy, trickle down job creation is of nominal
value. The subsidized urban economy lacks the true economic
foundations of an integrated city region and therefore is unable to
develop the necessary economic opportunities that will allow the
unskilled workers to advance within the market structure.' 5 This
203. See J. JACOBS, supra note 150; supra text accompanying notes 150-790.
204. See supra notes 150-79 and accompanying text.
205. Id.
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is not to say that no actual benefit accrues to the unemployed from
these projects, but it does suggest that policies that encourage
import-replacing activities rather than those that subsidize the
current array of selected projects can better provide trickle down
job opportunities.
The second problem with the trickle down assertion of those
supporting current co-financing activities is that current projects
result in urban gentrification, which can have negative effects
equal to or greater than any asserted benefits to the unskilled and
unemployed people living in or near the downtown center.2 0 6 Gen-
trification results when middle-class and upper-income people are
attracted to the downtown area because of the increase in upscale
shopping, eating, and working opportunities.0 7 In the process low-
income people are displaced either by the acquisition of their prop-
erty for the selected real estate projects or by rising rents and land
costs that make downtown living less affordable. 208 The disruption
of established neighborhoods and the dislocation of the urban poor
represent a social cost that classical liberals must consider in eval-
uating current co-financing programs even if trickle down theorists
do not. As a consequence, the alleged value of trickle down is offset
at least in part by the problem of gentrification.
The third problem with the trickle down assertion is that it
ignores simple economic realities about job creation. As long as
money is not stuffed in a mattress, it will be employed in some
capacity in the economy.209 The result is that jobs will be created
with that money. For instance, a city's using one million dollars in
tax revenues to subsidize a business that employs a number of peo-
ple only means that the one million dollars that would have been
available for individuals to invest in the marketplace has been
invested for them by the city.210 Individuals in possession of the
206. See Bryant & McGee, Gentrification and The Law: Combatting Urban Displace-
ment, 25 W.U. J. URn & C. L. 43 (1983); McDougall, Gentrification: The Class Conflict Over
Urban Space Moves Into The Courts, 10 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 177 (1982); LeGates & Hart-
man, Gentrification-Caused Displacement, 14 URB. LAW. 31 (1982); Note, Gentrification,
Tipping And The National Housing Policy, 11 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 255 (1982).
207. See supra note 206.
208. See id.; see also, e.g., INDIANAPOLIS: DOWNTOWN DEVELOPMENT FOR WHOM?, supra
note 129, at 12-18 (noting the dislocation of residents and destruction of many low-income
neighborhoods in order to make way for co-financed redevelopment projects).
209. The money will be spent on goods and services or donated to charity, which will
use it for goods and services. If the money is invested or saved, then the recipients of the
investment or deposit will use it on loans to others. See generally H. HAZLITr, supra note
123, at 177-90.
210. Id. at 31-36.
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money would have purchased more goods and services than they
otherwise were able to and thereby would have increased job
opportunities in the activities most valued by community mem-
bers. Thus, the one million dollars is still only one million dollars
no matter who is spending it, and the jobs created by one project
merely mean the loss of potential jobs elsewhere. The simple eco-
nomic reality relates back to the very first problem discussed in
connection with this trickle down assertion and supports the con-
clusion that trickle down benefits resulting from policies that favor
import-replacing activities would be greater than the benefits gen-
erated by current practices of co-financing specific real estate
projects.
Ultimately, the arguments in favor of subsidizing the construc-
tion of shopping centers, hotels, office buildings, and restaurants
through the process of co-financing must be viewed as special
interest arguments asserted as justification for the use of the polit-
ical means. The assertion that the location problem for these types
of real estate projects in itself is evidence of market failure is an
unsupported argument that covers special interests' preference for
a different location for resource employment from the location dic-
tated by individual preferences effected through the private mar-
ket. Likewise, the actual benefits from trickle down job creation, at
best, are much less valuable than those proclaimed by the special
interests that will benefit from construction of the subsidized real
estate project. Thus the supporters of many current co-financing
activities demonstrate the typical attitudes and practices analyzed
in the section of this Article dealing with the political and eco-
nomic dynamics of co-financing.
Given this classical liberal perspective on many current co-
financing activities, it is now possible to discuss specific recommen-
dations. The discussion of recommendations will follow in three
parts. First, the permissible types of projects for co-financing will
be outlined. Second, guidelines for co-financing participation will
be established. Third, recommendations will be made concerning
alternatives to co-financing that would improve the urban eco-
nomic environment in ways consistent with facilitating import-
replacing activities.
Permissible projects for co-financing activities must satisfy a
two part test of being the type of project the private market falls
to provide for and serving a function essential to preserving indi-
vidual human dignity. On these grounds, this Article rejected co-
financing of shopping centers, hotels, office buildings, and restau-
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rants. In order to meet this two part test, a completely different
list of projects must be developed. An outline of acceptable
projects would include the following: low-income housing to pro-
vide basic shelter for the poor, day care facilities for low-income
people and the underemployed to allow them to engage more fully
in the marketplace, and job training and retraining facilities to
develop the working potential of the poor and retrain workers dis-
placed by the dynamics of the local employment market as changes
in technology and market forces affect the continued or future
employability of specific job skills.
All the acceptable projects outlined above focus on the types
of projects that the private market is unlikely to invest in because
the poor, unemployed, and underemployed lack the purchasing
power to make such investments profitable. These are not merely
projects in which substantial investment is occurring elsewhere.
Rather, they are projects that would receive no substantial private
investment but for the assistance of government subsidies. Because
the market truly falls to produce these projects, co-financing activ-
ities could be justified as one method of assisting in these projects'
development.
As to the second part of the two part test of acceptability,
each of the co-financing projects outlined above is designed to
address the basic and fundamental rights of individuals. In es-
sence, these projects raise the issue of whether the government
should subsidize the needs of a certain class of people when the
private market fails to allocate resources for their use. This is fun-
damentally a moral question that cannot be resolved by simple
utilitarian cost-benefit analysis.211 As I have argued in an earlier
article, economic analysis that fails to incorporate an understand-
ing of moral philosophy and inalienable rights fails to serve a valu-
able purpose in resolving many of our nation's most pressing social
problems. 212 This focus on morality in economic analysis is consis-
tent with the classical liberal philosophy of Adam Smith, Friedrich
Hayek, and Milton Friedman. 213 Access to both basic shelter and
job training opportunities are within the confines of reasonable ex-
pectations for individual liberty and human dignity in a free soci-
211. See Malloy, supra note 13, at 176-77; see also Krietmeyer, Toward A Consensus
On Economic Rights: The Pastoral Letter of the Catholic Bishops, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 117 (1986); Scalia, Morality, Pragmatism And The Legal Order, 9 HARV. JL. & PUB.
POL'Y 123 (1986).
212. See Malloy, supra note 13, at 177.
213. See supra note 198.
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ety. Thus, projects that aid the poor in the way the projects out-
lined above do are acceptable for co-financing subsidies. Even if
one were to disagree with this proposition, however, it would be
incumbent upon the dissenter to demonstrate that no moral basis
supports providing such minimal services to the poor. Finally, even
if that demonstration were made, it would in no way justify the co-
financing of shopping centers, hotels, office buildings, and
restaurants.
All in all, the change in the direction of co-financing activities
suggested by this outline of acceptable projects is essential to pre-
serving the proper and limited role of government in a free society.
By requiring that government limit its activities to those cases in
which there is true market failure and in which there is a moral
basis for acting to protect an individual's liberty, the role of lim-
ited government is preserved. Government action in these situa-
tions is no different from government action in providing for pub-
lic roads and other infrastructure and service needs. When private
individuals cannot profitably provide infrastructure and services
that nonetheless are important to the concept of social order, econ-
omists generally have accepted a governmental role. The reorder-
ing of co-financing activities recommended in this Article, there-
fore, would make such activities consistent with the traditionally
accepted principles of limited government.
Presuming an acceptable type of project is presented, govern-
ment co-financing activities need to be restricted by certain guide-
lines. These guidelines must focus on three requirements. First,
guidelines must identify the scope of liability that should attach to
a city acting in a co-financing capacity to complete an acceptable
project with a private developer. Second, in order to preserve the
largest possible sphere of individual liberty in a capitalist society,
meaningful constitutional limitations must be placed on justifica-
tions for government co-financing activities. Third, adequate infor-
mation must be available for assessing the costs and benefits of co-
financing projects and for serving as a basis for making govern-
ment more accountable for its conduct.
As this Article argued earlier, local governments engaged in
co-financing activities ought to be held to the same standards of
liability and obligation as is a private developer or lender.214 Gov-
ernmental activities in this area are similar to their private market
counterparts, and local governments, therefore, should not enjoy
214. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
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any lower standards of care or commercially reasonable conduct.
Making local government stand on equal footing with the private
developers chosen for co-financing activities also encourages a
more business-like approach to the construction and completion of
projects. It also should make the full cost of engaging in co-financ-
ing activities more apparent to local government officials and their
constituents and thereby will make for a more fully informed deci-
sionmaking process.
Constitutional limitations on government co-financing activi-
ties must be limitations of substance, rather than of mere form. A
free society based on a limited governmental role must require
sound justifications for employing the government's power in the
pursuit of economic development. As this Article demonstrated,
constitutional limitations on government activities that restrict
competition in the private sector and employ both public funds
and the power of eminent domain are circumvented easily. 15 Cur-
rent trends indicate a growing acceptance of broadly defined public
welfare justifications that can permit a complete array of govern-
ment activity in the private real estate development sector of the
economy."' 8 In order to prevent the eventual full scale governmen-
tal intrusion into the traditional activities of the private market-
place, government assistance to private developers must be limited
to only those projects acceptable for co-financing. This means that
constitutional restrictions ought to prevent co-financing of shop-
ping centers, hotels, office buildings, and restaurants because these
projects do not involve the traditional grounds for government
activity. Justifications in support of using governmental powers,
such as condemnation, ought to be limited to those few cases in
which a market failure exists and the project is essential to pro-
tecting individual human dignity. This limitation, of course, would
restrict drastically the type of activities government could support
through co-financing, but in a free society based on a capitalist ec-
onomic structure, the role of government should be limited.
Adequate information is essential for assessing the costs and
benefits of a co-financing project and for making government more
accountable for its conduct. 17 Providing information in this con-
text, however, means more than simply publishing expected budget
and return items in the local newspaper. This, of course, is not to
215. See supra notes 57-80 and accompanying text.
216. Id.
217. See supra text accompanying note 190.
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say that such publication is without merit, but only that such pub-
lication does not provide full information, nor does it demonstrate
the significance of cost items in the budget. In order to insure bet-
ter information for the decisionmaking process, two requirements
must be met. First, to the extent possible, the city to receive the
primary benefits of the completed project should internalize the
entire cost of a co-financing project. Second, to the extent that
nonlocal funds are used in an acceptable co-financing project,
access to the outside funds should be linked to a local commitment
to facilitate import-replacing activity.
Internalizing the cost of a co-financing project would require a
city to finance its own activities just as an unsubsidized private
individual must do in buying goods or services in the private mar-
ketplace. Local politicians would have to engage in a convincing
dialogue in order to get sufficient local support for their proposed
projects. Without a source of nonlocal funds or cross-subsidies on
which to draw, local residents would carry the full cost of the city
project. In this way, co-financing arrangements would be subject to
close scrutiny because local taxpayers would see the exact result of
the government's use of their money. Each individual would be
able to see exactly what other projects or investments were given
up in order to pursue the project selected. This would allow for a
more informed decisionmaking process and would give substance
to the notion that as the potential recipients of an improved urban
environment, the local residents should be willing to pay the full
cost of the benefits they hope to enjoy.
In a less than ideal world, it may be impossible to avoid the
politics that make nonlocal funds available to cities seeking to
engage in co-financing projects. Quite frankly, it may be appropri-
ate to have outside funds made available to a city in certain cir-
cumstances. A particular city may be extremely poor or may be
experiencing dramatic changes in its local economy that place
many residents on unemployment and welfare. Such a city would
be unable to afford co-financing projects. As long as co-financing
activities are limited to projects that benefit low-income people,
the use of nonlocal funds can be justified provided those funds are
linked to the encouragement of import-replacing activity. Linkage
is important because, ultimately, subsidies for co-financing projects
remain just that, regardless of their origin, and in order to foster
real long-term economic growth and opportunity, a city must es-
cape its need for subsidies and develop a strong and dynamic local
economy. Thus, for instance, the receipt of federal funds may be
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conditioned on requirements that the city eliminate or reduce neg-
ative business restrictions such as rent controls or excessive zoning
requirements that discourage investment. In this way, nonlocal
funds are made available at the expense of eliminating bad local
economic policy, rather than as a way to use outside funds to offset
the undesirable effects of local special interest legislation.218
Given this Article's recommendations for the limited types of
projects acceptable for co-financing and the guidelines for their
implementation, a city still has ways by which to encourage com-
mercial economic development. The methods employed to en-
courage development or revitalization must be compatible with the
need to facilitate import-replacing activities within the city region.
Furthermore, the steps taken to encourage economic activity
should be of a general rather than outcome specific nature. In
other words, government policy should be expressed by general
rules applicable to all people, rather than by specific rules designed
to create incentives for specific enterprises or special interest
groups.2 19
Instead of local politicians trying to second guess the market-
place or trying to create specific incentives for select special inter-
est groups, the process of general rules would be aimed at enhanc-
218. See Hoeflich & Malloy, supra note 123. This article discusses many bad effects of
local special-interest legislation in the housing area. In addition, it recommends limiting or
eliminating federal funds for states that employ undesirable local housing regulations, such
as rent controls. Id. at 683-89.
219. See F. HAYEK, supra note 16, at 220-28.
The classical argument for freedom in economic affairs rests on the tacit postulate that
the rule of law should govern policy in this as in all other spheres. We cannot under-
stand the nature of the opposition of men like Adam Smith or John Stuart Mill to
government "intervention" unless we see it against this background. Their position was
therefore often misunderstood by those who were not familiar with that basic concep-
tion; and confusion arose in England and America as soon as the conception of the rule
of law ceased to be assumed by every reader. Freedom of economic activity had meant
freedom under the law, not the absence of all government action. The "interference" or
"intervention" of government which those writers opposed as a matter of principle
therefore meant only the infringement of that private sphere which the general rules of
law were intended to protect. They did not mean that government should never con-
cern itself with any economic matters .... To Adam Smith and his immediate succes-
sors, the enforcement of the ordinary rules of common law would certainly not have
appeared as government interference; nor would they ordinarily have applied this term
to an alteration of these rules or the passing of a new rule by the legislature so long as
it was intended to apply equally to all people for an indefinite period of time ....
There is perhaps no aim which they would not have regarded as legitimate if it was
clear that the people wanted it; but they excluded as generally inadmissible in a free
society the method of specific orders and prohibitions.
Id. at 220-21.
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ing the economic environment of the entire city region. Examples
of this type of program would include across the board reductions
in local taxes, streamlining planning and zoning regulations, and
expending city revenue on traditional infrastructure and services,
such as roads, that enhance all types of economic activity. A city
also might seek to enhance its economic environment by actively
promoting competitive reductions in state-wide income taxes, pro-
moting right to work laws, or reducing unnecessary economic regu-
lation of business. Finally, a city properly might engage in a study
of its strengths and weaknesses and expend revenue in promoting
its economic advantage as a means of furnishing information to the
private marketplace.22 ° Such urban policies would promote an
environment conducive to import-replacing activities necessary for
achieving economic growth and at the same time protect the free
flow of capital, technology, labor, and ideas.
All these recommendations, from the types of projects accept-
able for co-financing and the guidelines for their implementation
to the suggested alternative methods of seeking economic develop-
ment, are consistent with the classical liberal view on the proper
relationship between government and the individual in a free soci-
ety. First, acceptable projects for co-financing are limited and can
be justified only when there is true market failure and the govern-
ment's involvement in correcting the market failure is within the
traditional, limited confines of activity necessary to insure individ-
ual liberty.221 These requirements dramatically reduce the
problems associated with use of the political means. When prop-
erly implemented, these requirements reduce governmental intru-
sion into the marketplace and allow individual preferences, as
expressed in the marketplace, to enjoy the largest possible sphere
of expression consistent with the needs of society and individual
liberty. When properly restricted, government can protect individ-
ual liberty and human dignity while avoiding complete capture by
special interest groups bent on employing the power of the state in
an effort to exploit others in ways not possible in the competitive
220. For example, a city may find that it is ideally situated for the needs of the high-
tech electronics industry and may be able to encourage private investment by providing the
market with better information about the city's particular location. For factors to consider
with a high-tech strategy, see Gorlow, High-Tech Location Decisions and Corporate Dy-
namics, URB. LAND, Dec. 1984, at 14; Porter, Research Parks: An Emerging Phenomenon,
URB. LAND, Sept. 1984, at 6; Loughlin, High Tech and Real Estate: Basic Realities, URB.
LAND, June 1984, at 32.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 197-202, 210-15 (concerning the type of
projects acceptable for co-financing).
1987]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
marketplace.
Second, these recommendations dramatically reduce the philo-
sophical problems with promoting government ownership in a soci-
ety otherwise committed to a capitalistic structure in which the
means of production are owned by private individuals.222 As long
as government co-financing arrangements are limited to the types
of projects recommended in this Article, the government will not
intrude on significant private market activity and, therefore,
should avoid losing its ability to make impartial decisions concern-
ing urban planning and future development. At the same time,
people engaged in private market activities will be forced to con-
tinue to compete in the marketplace without linking the financial
success of their commercial projects to the city's ownership inter-
est, and this should preserve a basis for greater independence and
diversity in the debate over urban policy.
Third, these recommendations are designed to provide people
with more information than currently is available concerning the
nature of government co-financing activities.223 To the extent that
these recommendations allow individuals to appreciate more
clearly the costs and benefits of a given project and the implica-
tions of governmental intrusion into the market, they provide a
basis for more informed decisionmaking and for increased govern-
mental accountability.
Finally, to the extent that these recommendations preserve
the limited function of government and to the extent that they
provide a moral and philosophical framework for addressing urban
policy, they are less likely to lose their normative value.224 These
recommendations represent a reasoned and principled approach to
urban revitalization and are not merely an attempt to expand the
"grab bag" of subsidies available for special interest groups. Addi-
tionally, they are based on traditionally accepted American values
of individual liberty, free enterprise, and a government role limited
to instances of market failure and protection of fundamental moral
values concerning individual human dignity. As a consequence,
this Article's recommendations are normatively more desirable in
the long run than many current co-financing practices.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 187-90 (concerning the philosophical
problems of government ownership in a capitalist society based on private ownership).
223. See supra text accompanying notes 188-93 (concerning the need for better
information).
224. See supra text accompanying notes 191-96 (concerning normative values and the
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In addition to being consistent with classical liberal philoso-
phy, these recommendations also are consistent with Jane Jacobs'
observations about the necessary path to long-term economic
growth, prosperity, and opportunity. 225 These recommendations
focus on creating an environment conducive to the economic dy-
namics essential to facilitating import-replacing activity while they
reduce the role of government loans, grants, and subsidies. Only
through enhanced import-replacing activity can true economic pro-
gress continue, for government loans, grants, and subsidies can
provide only short-term relief for urban problems without cor-
recting the structural difficulties underlying these problems.
VI. CONCLUSION
In a sense, America's urban centers are experiencing a renais-
sance of sorts that reflects the vitality of a renewed interest in the
city. Observations of this activity reveal an impressive array of new
downtown real estate projects being constructed and the
reemergence of more affluent people working, living, shopping, and
entertaining in America's downtowns. Beneath the glossy first im-
pressions, however, is a complicated product of political and eco-
nomic dynamics that, when analyzed, reveals that the renaissance
may be something less than meets the eye.
The focus of this Article has been on analyzing the political
and economic dynamics of co-financing arrangements in the man-
ner of a traditional political economist using a classical liberal per-
spective. This analysis revealed that many current co-financing
activities are merely the product of special interest group politics.
These special interest groups successfully are circumventing pri-
vate market allocations of resources by using the political means in
support of their own profits. Significantly, they use the political
means to support projects not justified by market failure condi-
tions or by their fundamental contribution to the preservation of
individual liberty and human dignity.
The proper method of engaging in co-financing arrangements
is to pursue projects in which the limited and legitimate role of
government is preserved. This means restricting government co-
financing activities to limited types of projects: projects that serve
low-income people and that otherwise would go unsupplied
because the private market will not address these needs in the
225. See supra text accompanying notes 150-79 (concerning the needs of the urban
economy).
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absence of significant purchasing power. In fulfilling this govern-
mental function through real estate co-financing, a city must be
restricted by certain guidelines, but a city is free to use certain
limited alternatives to co-financing that would support and
encourage local economic development.
The guidelines and recommendations suggested by this Article
are designed to promote co-financing activities and urban revitali-
zation by means consistent with classical liberal philosophy. The
resulting recommendations also are consistent with the process of
assuring long-term economic growth, prosperity, and opportunity
in America's city regions. Such economic development cannot
occur solely through government loans, grants, and subsidies.
These governmental responses provide short-term relief for the ec-
onomically strapped, but do little if anything to bring about the
necessary structural change and development needed to assure the
personal and societal benefits resulting from a strong urban
economy.
In this context, it is clear that the current urban renaissance
may fall short of expectations. In fact, to the extent it is based on
the short-term effects of government loans, grants, and subsidies,
current activity may represent merely an interim stage of economic
activity that will be followed by a less healthy and less dynamic
urban economy than that existing before the so-called renaissance.
In order to avoid this consequence and in order to reestablish the
proper and limited role of government in a free society, it is essen-
tial to expand the scope of the current dialogue on urban policy.
Ultimately, this Article's goal has been to give new direction to this
dialogue and to suggest the classical liberal alternative to current
approaches to urban revitalization.
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